Part I: Phenomenological Preface

Overtly phenomenological study of music in Husserl’s sense begins with the man himself, who made central to his theories of perception a famous analysis for perceiving a sustained tone.¹ That analysis is highlighted by Izchak Miller in a recent philosophical commentary, which the interested reader will find especially clear.² Miller puts the heart of the matter as follows:

Whereas it does seem true that I am hearing that tone throughout a certain interval of time, it does not seem it can be true that I am hearing all of it (or an extended part of it) at any given instant of that interval. Yet . . . throughout that interval I continuously experience the endurance, or the continuity, of that tone, and this requires (contrary to the previous hypothesis) that I experience at any given instant . . . more than a mere instantaneous phase of the tone. How, then, is an instantaneous perceptual experience of the temporal continuity, or the temporal passage, of a tone possible?

Answering this and other related questions about our temporal awareness is of crucial importance to Husserl for reasons which go beyond the mere desire to provide an adequate, or a complete, account of perception. The subject matter of Husserlian phenomenology is our conscious experience, and Husserl presupposes our ability to reflect on our various experiences and discern their structures. However, our conscious experiences, or—as Husserl calls them—our acts of consciousness, are themselves processes, albeit mental processes. How do we, then, succeed in being reflectively aware at any given moment of the continuity, or the passage, of our mental acts? How does one, in other words, succeed in reflecting at any given moment on anything more than the corresponding momentary phase of the act reflected upon?

According to Husserl, the structure of our temporal awareness which makes the continuous perception of the temporal passage of a tone possible is the very same structure which makes a continuous reflection on the temporal passage of our mental acts possible. Accounting for the possibility of the first is, thus, accounting for the possibility of the second.\(^3\)

Miller also devotes much attention to “Husserl’s Account of Perceiving a Melody.”\(^4\) This discussion, which includes an account of listening to the opening theme from Mozart’s Clarinet Concerto, does not itself invoke sophisticated music-theoretical apparatus; still, any theorist interested in Schenker, or Kurth, or Leonard Meyer, or Narmour—or serialism for that matter—is sure to find the commentary, in the context of Miller’s book, resonating with familiar mental/aural experiences.

Among explicitly phenomenological writers who do invoke sophisticated music-theoretical concepts, Judith Lochhead is especially noteworthy. Her dissertation in particular projects an avowedly phenomenological view of Western art music from many periods; it comments very suggestively on temporal issues that have to do with our finding much recent music recalcitrant to received analytic approaches, a problem that she finds phenomenological in nature.\(^5\)

Thomas Clifton also proclaimed a phenomenological approach to music theory, although of a quite different sort. The title of his recently published book reflects his stance.\(^6\) Taylor Greer’s perceptive critique of Clifton’s earlier work does not extend to this book, but Greer is well worth reading for anyone interested in the methodological issues raised by applying phenomenology to music theory.\(^7\) The book itself has recently been reviewed concisely and perceptively by Nicholas Cook and by James Tenney.\(^8\)

Few professional music theorists have proclaimed so explicitly phenomenological a program or approach as have those just mentioned. However, phenomenological thinking is implicitly manifest in the work of others as well. Jonathan Kramer’s temporal studies (e.g., Kramer, 1981) engage such modes of thought.\(^9\) So

9. See, for example, Jonathan Kramer, “New Temporalities in Music,” *Critical Inquiry* 7.3 (1981), 539–556. Kramer was a consulting editor for *Music Theory Spectrum*, vol. 7 (1985), an issue devoted entirely to time and rhythm in music. The volume contains much material of relevance to this article. Its editor is Lewis Rowell, who has himself done extensive work on temporality in music. Of phenomenological interest (and of wider interest too) is his article “The Subconscious Language of Musical Time,” *Music Theory Spectrum* 1 (1979), 96–106. Rowell notes in particular that “the terms for temporality
do Christopher Hasty’s. So, in a less obvious way, does a recent study of my own. The article builds a numerical model that counts, at each “now”-time t, the number of time-spans I recall from the pertinent recent past that have (had) duration d. In this way I construct a function W(d,t) that gives me an “unfolding durational-interval vector” as the “now”-cursor t advances. The concept underlying my construction engages a Husserlian two-dimensional model of perceptual time, a model that allows both for Husserl’s “primal impressions,” impressions that follow the now-cursor t, and also for Husserl’s “retentions,” projections of remembered past times (and past durations) into my present consciousness. Later in my article, I even become involved with something much like Husserl’s “protensions,” projections of future expectations into present consciousness. Since writing the article, I have found the idea of an “unfolding rhythmic interval vector” highly suggestive in connection with a great variety of other rhythmic formalisms.

Marvin Minsky—like myself I suppose—is not popularly considered a phenomenologically oriented thinker. And yet the following quotation would find itself very much at home in Husserl’s *Time-Consciousness*: “to really understand how memory and process merge in ‘listening’ we will simply have to use much more ‘procedural’ descriptions—that is, the kinds that can describe how processes proceed.” Minsky makes his statement in connection with a critique of “generative” and ‘transformational’ methods of syntactic analysis.” He means neo-Schenkerian methods. The same species of criticism is voiced by Eugene Narmour when, protesting what he calls the “schemata” and “archetypal patterns” of Schenkerian theory, he writes that “the true ‘genetic’ basis in musical process is to be found by discovering what patterns imply in prospect . . . in relation to what they realize in retrospect.” This sort of discourse jibes well with Husserl’s vocabulary: primal impressions are patterns doing Narmour’s work of presently-implying-and-realizing; retentions are retrospective contexts brought into present perception; protensions are prospective contexts brought into present perception.

The works of the nonphenomenologists just cited suggest but do not formulate and examine very adequately the idiosyncratically recursive aspects of Husserl’s

in music . . . denote physical gesture as well as the more abstract thing that is measured by the gesture” (102–103); his elaboration of this idea ties in suggestively with remarks I shall make much later concerning performance as a mode of perception.


12. For the model, it is perfectly workable to replace the exact number “d” by the idea, “more-or-less-d, as distinguishable from other durations I retain in my awareness at time t.”

13. Husserl’s terms and pertinent diagrams are explained in Miller, *Husserl*, 120ff.

14. I explore this in my book, *Generalized Musical Intervals and Transformations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987). [See, for example, sections 3.3.1 and 5.4.2 therein.]

15. Marvin Minsky, “Music, Mind, and Meaning,” in *Music, Mind, and Brain*, ed. M. Clynes (New York: Plenum, Press, 1982), 1–19. The quotation appears on page 6. Compare this excerpt from Miller, cited earlier in this article: “our conscious experiences, or—as Husserl calls them—our acts of consciousness, are themselves processes, albeit mental processes. How do we, then, succeed in being reflectively aware at any given moment of the continuity, or the passage, of our mental acts?”

perception-structures. By the italicized term I mean to suggest the way in which such structures characteristically involve themselves in loops with other perception-structures that are among their objects or arguments. The other perception-structures are typically in characteristic relationships to the given structure (e.g. of retention, protension, implication, realization, denial), and those relationships, as well as other sorts of relations between perceptions, can also enter into recursive configurations as objects or arguments of perception-structures.

Let me illustrate the sort of loop I mean by a simple example using English text. Consider a thing we might call a perception, that is $p = \text{Siegmund's watching Sieglinde's watching Siegmund's watching Sieglinde's watching \ldots}$ (etc.). We can study the infinitely recursive aspect of $p$ by using a pair of finite perceptions $SGM$ and $SGL$, defined in a mutually recursive relationship. $SGM = \text{Siegmund's watching SGL}$, and $SGL = \text{Sieglinde's watching SGM}$. The pair $SGM$ and $SGL$ can also generate another infinite perception $q$; $q$ is $\text{Sieglinde's watching Siegmund's watching \ldots}$ (etc.). A computer could generate $p$ by sending $SGM$ to some evaluation routine (let us call it EVAL); the machine would generate $q$ by EVALuating $SGL$. There is of course a small difficulty: in either case, the EVALuation would go on forever, trapped in an infinite loop. I can think of two ways to avoid this difficulty that make sense to me both in their eventual musical implications and in light of the small knowledge I possess of computer science. One would be to have an overriding external call from a more global part of the system interrupt the endless tryst of the sibling lovers. Another would be to have some sort of preliminary higher-level parsing applied to the environment before anything gets sent to the EVALuator. The parser could spot the endless loop; it would then arrange for the eventual EVALuation to be terminated (by a special symbol, jump instruction, or what you will) after a certain number of rides around the loop. This, after all, is what we ourselves do in writing out $p$, when we terminate with the special symbols “\ldots” and/or “(etc.)”, or something of the sort, once the loop structure has been made clear to the reader.\footnote{If the parser applies itself only to a restricted family of formal strings called “perceptions,” and the perceptions do not engage the parsing language itself, then certain technical “Church-Turing” problems should not arise. Computer buffs will know what I mean (although they may not agree). For other readers, one might put the matter this way in intuitive discourse: if parsing is to be applied, then musical perceptions should not form a “language,” and/or the parsing itself should be “imperceptible.”} The two methods of avoiding the infinite loop could be combined, producing EVALuated output like “Siegmund’s watching Sieglinde’s watching Siegmund’s watching \ldots Sieglinde’s suddenly noticing Hunding.” (Four Wagner tubas make an excellent external interrupt.)

Having explored the abstract textual example to help the reader get a feeling for the kinds of recursive systems in which I am interested, I shall now examine an abstract musical example (Example 4.1).

I shall be especially interested first in musical perceptions as objects of musical perceptions; this corresponds to $SGL$-as-an-object-of-$SGM$, or $SGM$-as-an-object-of-$SGL$, in the English example. Then I shall be interested in the specifically recursive aspect of certain musical perception structures; this corresponds to the recursive aspect of $SGM$-and-$SGL$ when considered together as a perception-structure.

Imagine a string ensemble playing the score shown by Example 4.1a, produc-
ing an acoustic signal that we shall call Signal(a). We ask, just what am I “perceiving” as I listen musically to that signal at the now-time corresponding to cursor-time X on the score? According to Husserl’s theory, what I am perceiving—let us call it Perception(a)—is a hugely complex network of things, things including other perceptions, their relations among themselves, and their relations to Perception(a) itself. I have, for example, perceptions (a1), “V7 harmony over the last beat,” (a2), “5th degree in the bass over the last beat,” and (a3), “7th degree in the melody over the last beat.” I perceive how the perceptions (al), (a2), and (a3) are interrelating among themselves. I perceive how each of them is relating to my overall Perception(a) at cursor-time X. And I am retaining perceptions of how (a1), (a2), and (a3) each relate to yet earlier perceptions. For instance, “5th degree in the bass over the last beat” at cursor-time X involves among its objects retained perceptions of “5th degree in the bass since the attack of the last beat” at every perceptually functional moment during the half-second of clock time preceding X; this is Husserl’s analysis of the sustained tone. “Dominant-seventh harmony over the last beat” at cursor-time X involves an analogous family of objects; it also has other objects that engage clock-time well behind the G7 chord itself, time within which other perceptions built musical contexts of the piece that can render significant my mental acts of “perceiving a dominant” and “perceiving a beat” at now-time X. To the extent that “dominant” and “beat” involve acculturated theoretical ideas and language, their contexts here are even partly outside the time of the entire musical performance.

Particularly interesting as an object of Perception(a) is a perception corresponding to the score of Example 4.1b. Let us call this object Perception(b). Perception(a) does not notice Perception(b) in a vacuum; it perceives Perception(b) in certain relations to Perception(a), relations that include at least “protension” (if not “implication”). The difference between this view of affairs and the traditional view needs considerable emphasis. In the traditional view, Perception(b) “has not yet happened” at cursor-time X, but we “expect” it, perhaps with a certain probability or entropy value. In the Husserlian view, Perception(b) does actually happen at cursor-time X: I perceive at time X the structure symbolized by the score of Example 4.1b, and that perception—along with certain of its relationships—is one object of Perception(a) at cursor-time X. Among the relationships are protension (“coming up”), mensurated protension (“coming up in one beat’s time”), likelihood (“very likely in the pertinent Markoff chain”), and others.

“The C eight-three chord” is not an object of my perception at time X, at least not directly. The chord is perceived only indirectly, as an object of Perception(b),
which is as yet perceived only as an object of Perception(a). It is not “the C chord” that is “very likely coming up in one beat’s time”; rather it is “the confirmation-time for Perception(b)” that is “very likely coming up in one beat’s time,” as I perceive things at X. Listening at that time to Signal(a), I do not form the idea of a disembodied C major chord coming up over the next beat as a context-free phenomenon; I do have a mental construct of a C major chord coming up over the next beat, but only in the context of a broader mental construct that is Perception(b).

We are now in a position to explore what I have called the recursive aspects of musical perception-structure. We can approach our study by inquiring after the objects of Perception(b). Among them we shall find Perception(a) itself, in a particular relationship to (b). Using Narmour’s terminology, we could describe the relationship by saying that what-we-perceive in Perception(b) includes Perception(a) in a relation of implication-realized. Here we encounter a branch of the recursion, for if we inquire what we perceive that is implied by (a), we find that it is just Perception(b) in a relation of realization-implied. We can isolate the recursive aspect of the situation by formulating expressions IMP and RLZ in the earlier manner of SGM and SGL: IMP = (a)’s implication of RLZ; RLZ = (b)’s realization of IMP.

For a more general model of perception, though, we shall not want to isolate recursive relationships in this way from their parent perceptions; our primary focus must be on the perceptions themselves as totalities. Here is how the model I shall soon propose will address the recursive loop above: Perceptions (a) and (b) will each be defined by a formal list of a certain sort; in the list for Perception(a), we might place a formal subargument consisting of the pair [Perception (b), implication], while in the list for Perception(b) we should then place a formal subargument consisting of the pair [Perception(a), realization]. One can imagine the recursive potentialities of the situation to lie within two symbolic computer statements: (DEFINE Perception(a) . . . ( . . . (Perception(b),implication) . . . )); (DEFINE Perception(b) . . . ( . . . ( . . . (Perception(a),realization) . . . ) . . . ) ).

By casting my discourse into symbolic computer language of this sort, I mean to suggest the possible utility of Artificial Intelligence (actor language, frames, et al.) in studying these matters. Thereby I mean specifically to make points of contact with Minsky, and with certain features of Miller’s presentation as well. Minsky (“Music, mind and meaning”) devotes a lot of attention to programming strategies. Miller (Husserl, pp. 93–97) uses at times a formalism involving argument lists that suggests an AI environment. Soon I shall develop my own model in more detail.

18. Within the DEFINE list for Perception(a), the formal term “implication” could be suitably qualified by a formal probability value or entropy value, modeling an intuitive level of expectation or predictability associated with the “implication” of Perception(b), or of something-(b)-like in some well-stipulated sense. Alternatively, one could build refinements like these into a formal definition of “implication.”

19. My stance here is not particularly new or original. Points of contact between Husserl’s phenomenology and the worlds of Artificial Intelligence are the primary subject, for instance, of a recent publication edited by H. L. Dreyfus and H. Hall, Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1982), that assembles fifteen related essays. The editors’ introduction contains sections headed “Husserl’s Anticipation of Artificial Intelligence” (17–19) and “Husserl’s (and AI’s) Problems” (19–27); the former section characterizes Minsky’s frame construct of 1973 as “a new data structure remarkably similar to Husserl’s for representing everyday knowledge” (19). Particularly important work in this area has been done by Otto Laske. In “Toward an Explicit Cognitive
Before I get to that, though, let me dwell on something that may have slipped the reader’s attention by now: while we have been freely discussing Perception(b) as part of what-(a)-perceives (at cursor-time X), and Perception(a) as part of what-(b)-perceives, nowhere in our discussion have we supposed that our imaginary quartet actually plays the score of Example 4.1b, producing an acoustic stimulus we might call Signal(b). The point deserves some exploration.

First let us suppose that the quartet does not continue their performance of Example 4.1a to produce a performance of Example 4.1b; suppose they instead perform Example 4.1c, producing acoustic Signal(c) and triggering an appropriate Perception(c). In this case, all the things we have so far said about Perception(b) and its relations, at now-time X, to Perception(a) remain exactly as we have already said them; the acoustic production of Signal(c) at now-time Y changes nothing of all that. Perception(b) as already discussed continues to “exist,” and it retains in retrospect at time Y all the functions it had at time X. Indeed it acquires a new function as well, in connection with Perception(c); one characteristic thing that (c) “perceives” is precisely that (b) is not being confirmed by the event of time Y. We imagine a computer statement: (DEFINE Perception(c) . . . ( . . . (Perception(b), denial) . . . ) . . . ). In order for (b) to be “denied” by (c) at time Y, (b) must be at hand at that time, in a phenomenological location different from that of (c). One must not think of (b) as “disappearing” and of (c) as “replacing” (b).

Let us consider next the trickier case in which the quartet does play Example 4.1b, producing acoustic Signal(b). The tricky thing is to realize that we now have at hand a new Perception (b-yes), a new perception that is different from our old acquaintance Perception(b). (b), as something (a) expects, defined at cursor-time X, continues to “exist” as in the previous case; now it additionally becomes at cursor-time Y an object of the new perception (b-yes). We might say that (b-yes) “confirms” (b), in the sense that (c) in the previous case “denied” (b). Symbolically, we could write (DEFINE Perception(b-yes) . . . (Perception(b),confirmation) . . . ) . . . ).

Part II: A General Model

If one were to sequester the notion of “good” continuation as a descriptor . . . in tonal music, one would have to introduce . . . powerful concepts of relation—including those of contradiction, opposition, and paradox—as natural to the process, even necessary to it.21


20. I must express very heartfelt gratitude to Fred Lerdahl and Diana Deutsch who, by inviting me to give a lecture about musical perception, started me thinking along the lines of this present chapter, and in particular along the lines of the model here proposed. The lecture, “Changing Perceptions over a Passage in Schubert,” was given at the Fourth Workshop on Physical and Neuropsychological Foundations of Music, Ossiach, Austria, in August of 1983.

To help us entertain the ideas discussed in Part I, and others of their ilk, I propose as a provisional model for “a musical perception” this basic formula:

\[ p = (EV, CTX, P-R-LIST, ST-LIST). \]

Here the musical perception \( p \) is defined as a formal list containing four arguments. The argument \( EV \) specifies a sonic event or family of events being “perceived.” The argument \( CTX \) specifies a musical context in which the perception occurs. The argument \( P-R-LIST \) is a list of pairs \( (p_i, r_i) \); each pair specifies a perception \( p_i \) and a relation \( r_i \) which \( p \) bears to \( p_i \). The argument \( ST-LIST \) is a list of statements \( s_1, \ldots, s_k \) made in some stipulated language \( L \).

As an example, we can construct one formal musical perception pertinent to our intuition of “what we hear” when a quartet plays the last quarter-note of Example 4.1c to finish a performance of Example 4.1c. For the formal perception, \( EV \) is “this thing that happens on the last beat.” \( CTX \) is all-of-Example 4.1c, and also a culturally conditioned theoretical component that makes us responsive to categories we call beats, keys, tonics, dominants, et al. The \( P-R-LIST \) includes a pair \( (\text{Perception}(b), \text{denial}) \). The \( ST-LIST \) might include, in a suitable language \( L \), a statement, “deceptive cadence.”

One might wonder why we need an argument \( EV \) at all, in the specific example or in the general model. In the example, we describe \( EV \) as “this thing that happens on the last beat.” Now “on the last beat” is a perceptual statement that might very easily be added to our \( ST-LIST \). Generalizing that observation, we can plausibly wonder what words we could possibly use, in pointing to an \( EV \), that could not be excised from the phrase “this thing that . . . ” and placed among the statements on a \( ST-LIST \). The language \( L \) could be expanded as necessary. Clearly we cannot describe \( EV \) or \( CTX \), for any specific example, without using some language \( L' \); then why not simply meld \( L \) and \( L' \) into one superlanguage? In that case our first argument \( EV \) is only a syntactic dummy, and we could reduce our model to a list of only three arguments: a context \( CTX \), a \( P-R-LIST \) of perceptions-cum-relations, and a \( ST-LIST \) of statements we are making at the moment, possibly including certain statements that focus our attention on this or that particular “event” in the given context.

I go over this possibility so that the reader will know I have considered it and rejected it, even though I admit its plausibility. I admit, too, the appeal to Occam’s Razor, and yet I would not be comfortable with a model that implicitly denied the existence of any “real event” apart from the various statements about it that could be articulated by various interested parties. The social and political history of the last fifty years certainly contributes to my discomfort, and I freely admit my bourgeois-liberal class bias, my susceptibility to the Will-to-Truth, and all the rest of my predilections in this position. I prefer to believe that the statements we make in connection with a perception are about something, which is to say about some thing. The thing \( EV \) will have at the very least a lexical function, enabling us to mark, collect, and compare a certain ensemble of formal perceptions, that is, perceptions-about-EV. The role of \( EV \) in my model corresponds in this respect with Miller’s analysis of Husserl’s “determinable-X.” Miller writes that there must
be “a feature . . . of the perceptual act which determines the (purported) object of the act in abstraction from its (purported) properties, a feature which provides us with an intentional ‘fix’ on that (purported) object through a course of experience along which the attribute-meanings of our act may shift and change radically. That feature of the perceptual noematic Sinn is what Husserl refers to by ‘the determinable-X.’ It seems that what Husserl has in mind is that the determinable-X of the perceptual act is a ‘purely referring’ element of meaning, something like a meaning of an indexical, probably (at least part of) the meaning of the word ‘this.’”

I share the urge to suppose such a demonstrable-X, my EV, although I am not persuaded of its logical necessity for perceptual discourse about music.

The necessity for a musical context CXT in such discourse is much clearer. For example, when perceiving the event of the a-minor chord in Example 4.1c, I have one set of impressions perceiving it in its own context, as an isolated harmonic structure, and quite another set of impressions perceiving it in the context of Example 4.1c as a whole. In the former context, I could not make statements involving a “deceptive cadence,” or a “cadence” of any sort, or indeed a “key” or a “beat.” Perceiving the isolated chord might involve further problems, in that I might not be able to locate its sound within the pertinent music: there might be more than one such sound in that music.

To illustrate the problem of locatability more thoroughly, let me suppose I have before me, poised and ready, a classical orchestra. I bring down my hand, cuing them in, and they produce a chord, forte and staccato, that lasts about one-third of a second; then they rest for about two-thirds of a second; then I cut them off. This “this,” this EVent, this determinable-X of the situation, is produced by these instruments on these notes: flutes on E♭6 and B♭5; oboes on G5 and E♭5; clarinets on E♭5 and G4; bassoons on E♭4 and E♭3; horns on E♭4 and G3; trumpets on E♭5 and E♭4; kettledrum on E♭3; first violins on G5, B♭4, E♭4, and G3; second violins on E♭5, E♭4, and G3; violas on E♭4 and G3; cellibass on E♭2 and E♭1. I turn to you and ask, “What was that?” You reply, “It must be the opening of the Eroica Symphony.” “No,” I respond, “it was actually measure 2 of the symphony.” “Unfair!” you exclaim. But why is it unfair? I had indeed instructed the players to play measure 2 when I cued them; they were in fact all looking at measure 2 in their parts as they played. In any conceivable sense you might imagine, they did play measure 2. Only you did not perceive measure 2! Your sense of unfairness arises here precisely because there is a crucial phenomenological sense in which measure 2 is not a well-formed Context. Measures 1-and-2-together are a well-formed Context; you would be able to locate measure 2 in that context. Measure 1 by itself, or rather measure 1 preceded by a certain amount of sound typical of “orchestra-not-playing,” is also a well-formed musical Context. That is why you immediately perceived measure 1. According to my model, you were quite correct in that perception; indeed it would have been impossible, in the formal sense of the model, for you to have perceived anything else in the context at hand.

22. Miller, Husserl, 70–71. We shall explore just such shifts and changes of attribute-meanings for fixed musical EVents, in the Schubert analysis that will occupy Part III of this chapter.
Let us study another example. Suppose I refer to the place in the *Waldstein* Sonata “where it goes like this,” playing or pointing to Example 4.2. Although the event is perfectly well defined as an acoustic stimulus, even as an auditory perception, there is no musical perception at hand, since you have only the vaguest idea of what I might be referring to, so far as the music under discussion is concerned. This is because the Event, the thing that “goes like this,” has not been located in an adequate Context. Failing such a CXT, you can not have a musical perception, although you have a perfectly clear auditory perception. If I refer to the Event of Example 4.2 as “the third eighth of measure 2,” I have placed it in an adequate musical Context. Event-and-context are suggested by Example 4.3.

### Example 4.3

**Allegro con brio**

If, on the other hand, I refer to the Event of Example 4.2 as “the sixth eighth-note of the reprise measure,” I have implicitly specified another Context, one that is suggested by Example 4.4.

### Example 4.4

**Allegro con brio**

I am claiming, in as radical a sense as you please, that “the sixth eighth of the reprise measure” does NOT sound like Example 4.2. It sounds like Example-4.4-focused-on-the-pertinent-event, so far as we are talking about musical perception. We are usually so talking when we speak of how a certain musical event “sounds.” In contrast, one could say that the acoustic signal delimited by the specific event gives rise to an auditory perception which “sounds” like Example 4.2. But that is a very different kind of statement.

The problem of locatability deserves much further study in its own right. Here, I shall indicate only one possible direction such study might take. Suppose that my orchestra is assembled here, and that they have not yet played anything for you. I
bring down my hand, cuing them in, and they produce a chord, fortissimo and staccato, that lasts about one-third of a second; then they rest for about two-thirds of a second; then I cut them off. The chord is as follows: flutes on G6 and B♭5; oboes on E♭5; clarinets on E♭5 and G4; bassoons on E♭4 and E♭3; horns on G4 and E♭4; trumpets on E♭5 and E♭4; kettledrum on E♭3; first violins on G5, B♭4, E♭4, and G3; second violins on G5, B♭4, E♭4, and G3; violas on E♭5, E♭4, and G3; cellibass on E♭3 and E♭2. I turn to you and ask, “What was that?” If you are Beethoven, or a responsible conductor, or a first-flute player, or an alert orchestral cellist, and so on, you might answer, “It was the penultimate measure from the first movement of the *Eroica,*” and you would be right. More likely, though, you will answer, “It was the opening of the *Eroica.*” “No,” I respond, “it was actually the penultimate measure of the first movement, measure 690.” “Unfair!” you exclaim. But now the unfairness is of a very different type. For the chord under discussion is locatable, “technically speaking.” You are protesting only because the demands that I am making on your ear, and on your knowledge of the symphony, seem unreasonable to you. You will nevertheless admit that a musician with an excellent ear and a thorough knowledge of the piece could “in theory” locate the chord. You will further admit that a student in an advanced conducting class, or an advanced orchestration class, might reasonably be asked to hear such subtle differences between sounds as are at issue here; you will admit that a student in an advanced analysis class might reasonably be asked to ponder why Beethoven comes so close to the sound of measure 1 in measure 690, but does not reproduce it exactly; you will admit in these connections the propriety, if not the sufficiency, of studying how measure 690 sounds in and of itself. That is, you will admit “in theory,” specifically in the theory I am now expounding, the propriety of measure 690 as a musical-perceptual Context for itself-as-Event.

The question remains, however, to what extent the event of that measure should be considered “practically” locatable in its own context. Most of us would agree that the demands I might make on an advanced music student are not to be made of “the listener,” and many of us will also suppose that any phenomenological theory of music, in our present understanding of “phenomenology,” will primarily address “the listener,” a fictive person whose role vis-à-vis the *Eroica* differs from that of the first flutist, cellist, or conductor playing it, or Beethoven composing it. We do suppose that the perceptions of “the listener” have some real and important relation to the things a composer does, and to things a performer does, but we would not want to equate the roles of composer, performer, and listener, at least not in our culture as it is today for better or for worse. The issue of “the listener” in this connection seems crucial to me. I shall return to it at length in Part V of this chapter.

Meanwhile, I should recall that locatability is only one of the matters involved when we stipulate a Context for the Event(s) of a musical perception. Even when all the events at issue are locatable, what we perceive—the p of our basic formula—depends on the context as well. Thus, to repeat an earlier point, the a-minor chord of Example 4.1c generates one perception in its own context, and a quite different perception in the context of Example 4.1c as a whole. In the analysis of a passage from Schubert that occupies Part III of this chapter, we shall have the occasion to
study some actual musical EVents whose perceptual significances shift radically as
their ConteXTs expand and/or contract in various musical dimensions.\(^{23}\)

Now let us return to the Basic Formula, \( p = (E,V,CXT,P-R-LIST,ST-LIST) \), and
devote some attention to P-R-LIST. This argument, it will be recalled, is a list of
pairs \((p_i, r_i)\), each pair specifying a perception \( p_i \) and a relation \( r_i \) which \( p \) bears to
\( p_i \). For example, \( p \) might “deny” \( p_1 \), “confirm” \( p_2 \), “imply” \( p_3 \), “support” \( p_4 \), and “suc-
ceed” \( p_5 \); the P-R-LIST for \( p \) would then include the pairs \((p_1, \text{denial})\), \((p_2, \text{confirmation})\),
\((p_3, \text{implication})\), \((p_4, \text{support})\), and \((p_5, \text{succession})\). These pairs model
the idea that we perceive \( p_i \)-being-denied, \( p_2 \)-being-confirmed, etc. as essential
parts of our \( p \)-perception.

The P-R-LIST enables us to model recursive aspects of perception-structuring;
as we saw in earlier discussion, that is a powerful and characteristic feature of
the model. Earlier, for example, we could speak of Perception(a) as perceiving Perception
(b)-being-implied, while Perception(b) perceived Perception(a)-being-realized. The
P-R-LIST for Perception(a) thus contained the pair \((\text{Perception(b), implication})\),
while the P-R-LIST for Perception(b) contained the pair \((\text{Perception(a), realization})\).

Eventually it may be necessary to formulate rules that determine when certain
recursive P-R configurations are malformed. A few such rules may already appear ob-
vious, but I would urge extreme caution in the matter. After studying Parts III and
IV of this chapter, the reader will see why I want to proceed so carefully. There we shall
see that the geometry and logic of musical perception are not easily inferable from the
geometry of Euclid or Descartes and the logic of Zermelo/Fraenkel or Gödel/Bernays.

In any event, we must not declare to be “malformed” loops that are simply in-
finite, like the implication/realization loop for Perceptions (a) and (b), or the tryst-
ing loop for Siegmund and Sieglinde. While exploring the Wagnerian loop, we in-
vestigated two ways to prevent an EVALuator from getting trapped in the loop; the
same expedients are available for the implication/realization loop, and for a large
class of similarly structured loops. The first expedient is to apply higher-level pars-
ing to the environment before attempting to EVALuate the perception-strings. The
parser would spot the loop and supply the EVALuator with a symbol like “ . . . ” or
“(etc.)” to finish off with, once a certain number of trips around the loop had made
the recursive structure clear.

The second expedient is to break off EVALuation upon a trigger signal from an
external interrupt, thus: Siegmund’s watching Sieglinde’s watching Siegmund’s
watching Sieglinde’s watching Siegmund’s suddenly hearing Hunding. Just like
Hunding’s tubas, our string quartet’s a-minor triad from Example 4.1c could func-
tion as this sort of external interrupt. The a-minor triad as a signal from outside the
listener could break off the chain of (a)’s implication of (b)’s realization of (a)’s
implication of (b)’s realization of (a)’s implication denied by (c). If the quartet
were to play Signal(b) instead of Signal(c), the C-major eight-three chord could

\[^{23}\text{The reader who wants to explore the abstract theory of ConteXTs farther will be interested in an}
extended study by Raphael Eric Atlas, "The Diachronic Recognition of Enharmonic Equivalence:
A Theory and its Application to Five Instrumental Movements by W. A. Mozart" (Ph.D. diss., Yale
University, 1983). This work explicitly and systematically investigates the roles of varying musi-
cal contexts in building perceptions involving enharmonic relationships of all sorts within tonal
compositions.\]
have a similar interrupt-function, stopping EVALuation of the (a)/(b) implication/realization loop and introducing the new Perception(b-yes). We might then perceive (a)’s implication of (b)’s realization of (a)’s implication of (b)’s realization being confirmed by (b-yes). The interrupt function for the a-minor five-three chord of Signal(c), or for the C-major eight-three chord of Signal(b), is an attractive theoretical conceit. The harmonic sonorities as interrupts from acoustic signals external to perception-EVALuation have a different species of function from any they might carry as arguments or subarguments within formal p-structures.

The species of function is different because the mechanism of the external interrupt necessarily presupposes, as an implicit feature of its model, an aspect of musical time that is not a mental construction of the listener; some temporal exigencies impinge upon the listener from without. Personally, I like the metaphor of that model very much. The alternate expedient for keeping the EVALuator out of infinite loops, the preliminary parser, does not necessarily presuppose any musical time external to the mind of the listener; the parser, along with the EVALuator et al., is metaphorically part of the apparatus through which a listener can build purely mental categories of space and time for the music perceived.

We return once more to the Basic Formula, \( p = (EV,CXT,P-R-LIST,ST-LIST) \), and focus now upon ST-LIST, the list of statements \( s_1, s_2, \ldots s_k \) made in some stipulated language L. Describing the ensemble of statements as a “list” is only a formatting convention here; the statements might, for example, be abstracted to represent an annotated two-dimensional graph. More generally, the language L might be a composite of several graphic and notational systems with a symbolic textual discourse, and also with a vernacular discourse like everyday English. The language might involve instead or as well poetic sayings or writings; it might involve Freudian free-associations. It might involve gestural “statements” from other communicative systems not usually brought under the rubric of “language,” gestures like writing down original compositional material, or performing musical passages. In Part V, I shall devote quite a bit of attention to the notion of composing and performing as means for making perception-statements; I shall more or less withhold that attention until then.

Imagining our utterances or gestures formatted as a “list” is a programming convenience, as I said before; it is not of-the-essence for our model. More of-the-essence, and more contentious, is the idea that a perception—as modeled by the basic formula—necessarily involves utterances or gestures of some kind. With this feature of the model I am asserting inter alia that formal musical perceptions are what are sometimes called “apperceptions,” since each one embodies “the process of understanding by which newly observed qualities of an object are related to past experience.”

24 The model goes even farther in asserting a specifically linguistic component, in a broad sense, for the way in which past experience is actively brought to bear on observation. Our sense of the past, in making perception-statements, is thereby necessarily involved with sociocultural forces that shaped the language L, and our acquisition of that language. In particular, to the extent

that the language L involves the language of any music theory, that means we must be ready to consider the context CXT for perception p as having a theoretical component, along with whatever psychoacoustic component it may possess. To illustrate the point, let us consider the acoustic signal produced by a piano playing the score in Example 4.5a.

Example 4.5

![Example 4.5](image)

Calling that signal “Signal 5,” let us talk about what we might perceive on hearing its last chord. One listener, hearing that event in that context, may say, “I hear a fourth-degree harmony.” This statement, an element of a ST-LIST for a pertinent p, implicitly invokes a theoretical context in which the bass F is four steps up a C major scale from the C below it. The theoretical context can be symbolized in the manner of Example 4.5b. The “music” of Example 4.5b is not projected by Signal 5, yet it is just as much a part of the CXT for the perception under examination; it allows the listener to hear “degrees” and to hear the F in the bass as the “fourth” one. Example 4.5b carries a long historical/cultural shadow involving the tetra-chordal analysis of the major scale, the Rule of the Octave, and other esoterica of which the listener may well be “unaware.”

Another listener may want to hear the same chord in the same acoustic context as a “subdominant.” To use that term on a statement-list for a suitable formal p, this listener will invoke a different theoretical component as part of the CXT; Example 4.5c would serve the purpose. In that example, the bass F of the Event in question is displayed lying the-interval-of-a-dominant below its theoretical tonic C, a middle C which has “already” generated the G that lies the-interval-of-a-dominant above it. This is what the term “subdominant” means, when used properly. It casts a long historical shadow involving Continental harmonic theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, along with their sociocultural contexts. The theoretical tonic of Example 4.5c is middle C, not viola C as in Example 4.5b. The listener who invokes the “subdominant” context of Example 4.5c will probably also invoke another theoretical context, an “octave equivalence” context that relates the middle C of Example 4.5c in some special way to the C an octave lower, the viola C that figures in the acoustic bass of Signal 5 itself. Indeed, Example 4.5c itself already presupposes a context of octave equivalence, since it assumes that the-interval-of-a-dominant corresponds to the harmonic ratio 2:3; that interval is an octave smaller than the theoretically “correct” harmonic interval given by the ratio 1:3; a ratio of unity-to-aliquot-part or fundamental-frequency-to-partial-frequency. The historical shadow of octave-equivalence in this sort of context includes important speculative work by Descartes, Rameau, and D’Alembert.
A third listener might perceive the final event of Signal 5 as a “dominant preparation,” thereby invoking the theoretical Context of Example 4.5d, with its Schenkerian shadows. The G in the bass of Example 4.5d may or may not eventuate in the acoustic continuation from Signal 5; that is irrelevant, since the G in the theoretical context is already part of “what is perceived” at the end of Signal 5 by the listener who hears a “dominant preparation.” As a linguistic resource, the theoretical G of Example 4.5d has no more and no less to do with acoustic signals than does the middle C of Example 4.5c, or the D of Example 4.5b; those are equally linguistic resources, enabling our other listeners to make other kinds of perception-statements in other theoretical languages.

Part III: A Passage from Schubert

To illustrate what the model of Part II can bring out in analysis, I shall discuss some aspects of Schubert’s song Morgengruß that are characteristically addressed by that model. Example 4.6 transcribes aspects of the strophe, and gives the concomitant text for the first stanza. I shall assume that the reader knows the piece well enough not to need more reminders of the complete music and text.25

Example 4.6

Köpfchen hin, als wär’ dir was geschehen? Verstört dich denn mein Gruss so schwer? so muss ich wie-der gehen, (usw)

25. The impetus for my discussion comes from a long unpublished essay I wrote on this piece, and on the methodology of analysis, in 1974. Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff generously credit the essay during their interesting analysis of the strophe in A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (Cambridge,
Example 4.7 tabulates aspects of the formal perceptions I propose to discuss. The perceptions are listed as $p_1$ through $p_9$ in the left-hand column of the example. Each perception, following the model, involves a family of EVents, a ConteXT for that family, a Perception-Relation-LIST, and a Statement-LIST. EVents are located by entries in the second column of the example; ConteXTs are located by entries in the third column. “Tonal theory” in some heuristic sense is understood as a component of each ConteXT. Selected pairs from the P-R-LISTs are entered in the fourth column of the example, and selected Statements from the ST-LISTs are entered in the fifth column, by reference to graphic examples that will presently be forthcoming.

### Example 4.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>EV</th>
<th>CXT</th>
<th>Selected P-R Pairs</th>
<th>Selected Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p_1$</td>
<td>m12</td>
<td>m12</td>
<td>$(p_1$, terminal inclusion)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$(V$-percept, questioning)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_2$</td>
<td>m12</td>
<td>m9–12</td>
<td>$(p_1$, incipital inclusion)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$(p_4$, implication)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{3a}$</td>
<td>m12–13</td>
<td>m12–13</td>
<td>$(p_1$, incipital inclusion)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$(p_4$, implication)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{3b}$</td>
<td>m12–13</td>
<td>m9–13</td>
<td>$(p_2$, denial) $(p_{3a}$, reinforcement)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_4$</td>
<td>m12–13</td>
<td>m12–13 plus expected m14</td>
<td>$(p_{3a}$, realization) (earlier d tonicization, elaboration)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_5$</td>
<td>m9–13</td>
<td>m9–13 plus expected continuation</td>
<td>$(p_4$, medial inclusion), (p_4, reinforcement) $(p_{3b}$, reinforcement), $(p_3$, virtual annihilation)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{6a}$</td>
<td>m14</td>
<td>m12–14</td>
<td>$(p_4$, confirmation and elaboration) $(p_{6b}$, implication)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{6b}$</td>
<td>m14</td>
<td>m12–14 plus expected m15 (in d minor)</td>
<td>$(p_{6a}$, realization), $(p_{7a}$, modification)</td>
<td>As in the commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{7a}$</td>
<td>m14</td>
<td>m12–14 plus expected m15 (seq.)</td>
<td>$(p_{6b}$, modification), $(p_{7a}$, sequential expansion)</td>
<td>Ex. 4.8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{7b}$</td>
<td>m14–15</td>
<td>m12–15</td>
<td>$(p_{7a}$, confirmation), $(p_{6b}$, denial) $(p_2$, confirmation) (via $p_{6a}$)</td>
<td>As in the commentary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mass.: The MIT Press, (1983), 264–269. Their analysis illustrates excellently the resources and powers of their theory. Since it uses extensively a different language L from mine, it “perceives” things differently; otherwise, I do not sense any major incompatibilities between their readings and mine. Their methodological approach to ambiguous readings definitely does differ from mine, both as expressed in the unpublished essay and as I shall develop it over Parts III and IV of this chapter.

The 1974 essay devoted a good deal of attention to the four-strophe form of the song. Thereby it found a large-scale sense of balance about the temporal extents of tonic and dominant in the song, a balance that resolves on a very high rhythmic level some of the discomfort Lerdahl and Jackendoff feel about those extents in the context of the-strophe-once-around. I too feel that discomfort in that context. The discussion in Part III here will not engage any context as extensive as even one strophe.
The perception $p_1$ in Example 4.7, for instance, addresses the EVents of measure 12 in the ConteXT of measure 12 (and tonal theory). So, in the row of Example 4.7 headed by “$p_1$” on the left, “m.12” is entered in the second column, the column of EVents, and “m.12” is also entered in the third column, the column of ConteXTs. Nothing is entered in the fourth column, the column of salient P-R pairs for $p_1$. This inferentially asserts that it is not crucial to hear $p_1$ in relation to other perceptions hereabouts, in order to perceive “what we are hearing when we hear measure 12 in its own context.”

**Example 4.8**

(4.8.1) (4.8.2) (4.8.3) (4.8.4)

(4.8.5) (4.8.6) (4.8.7) (4.8.8) (4.8.9)
What statements can we make about “what we are hearing when we hear measure 12 in its own context,” understanding also a context of tonal theory? Here is one: the measure elaborates $g^6$ harmony, with a D in the principal upper voice. That statement is entered in the fifth column of Example 4.7, the column of salient STatements about $p_1$. To save space, the English sentence is represented on the table by a reference to Example 4.8.1, an example that projects the sense of the statement in a compact graphic format.

Parts 4.8.1, 4.8.2, and so on of Example 4.8 correspond to the perceptions $p_1$, $p_2$, and so on of Example 4.7. Our exegesis of the first row from Example 4.7 is now complete: $p_1$ perceives measure 12 in its own context and in the context of tonal theory; therein the events elaborate $g$ minor harmony with $B^b_3$ in the bass and $D_5$ in a principal melodic voice.

We hear quite different and various other things about measure 12 when we hear the events of that measure in a variety of other, more extensive, contexts. The whole point of the present exercise is exactly to examine with some precision the variety of formal perceptions that are generated by such a variety of formal CXTs for the EVents of measure 12, and for other related families of EVents. It is meaningless—or at the very least thoroughly arbitrary—to invoke C major and its dominant, or d minor and its subdominant, when we are talking about perceiving measure 12 in its own context. Whether or not we wish to utter perception-statements about measure-12-in-its-own-context is another matter. I do, because I find the formal perception $p_1$ a useful entity to have at hand for the P-R-LISTS of other, broader, perceptions. To speak roughly in traditional terminology, I find it useful to be able to refer to “the $g^6$,” when I want to, without having to attribute any degree-function or other function in any key to the harmony and its root. A footnote later on will develop the methodological point.

There are other kinds of perception-statements I might make about the events of measure 12. For example, I might remark on the density of attacks in the accompaniment: only one pitch is attacked at a time, and the attacks come one-per-written-eighth-note. But I will probably not remark on those features of measure 12 in the context of measure 12 alone, that is without comparing it to other events, especially immediately-preceding events, in larger contexts. I would certainly not have the sense that the bass of measure 12 lies “in a high register” when I listen to that measure in its own context only. (By the italicized word, I intend more precisely a phenomenological context which makes me aware of my own singing voice, a pretty poor bass that comfortably reaches a fourth higher.) The things I am pretending to notice here, about the attack-densities and the register of the bass “in measure 12,” are not features of “measure 12” at all; they are, rather, matters that involve how what-I-notice-in-measure-12 engages in Perception-Relations with what-I-notice-elsewhere, all wrapped up in broader ConteXTs. Our model enables me to be precise and formal about these matters.

The perception $p_2$, in Example 4.7, engages one broader ConteXT for the EVents of measure 12, that is the context of measures 9–12. In that context, one’s attention is drawn to the attack-texture and bass register of the accompaniment in measure 12, and it would be appropriate to utter pertinent statements about those matters on the ST-LIST for $p_2$. On the P-R-LIST for $p_2$, one might then refer to per-
ceptions involving the accompaniment textures for measures 9–10, for measure 11, for measures 9–10–11, and so on, as those perceptions relate to \( p_2 \). To save space, I have not selected such statements and relations for coverage in the ST and P-R columns of Example 4.7.

On that example, the P-R-LIST for \( p_2 \) does contain the pair \( (p_1, \text{terminal inclusion}) \); this pair perceives the time-span over which \( p_1 \) “happens” as a terminal segment within the time-span over which \( p_2 \) “happens.” The P-R-LIST for \( p_2 \) on the example also contains the pair \( (V\text{-percept, questioning}) \); this pair notices a perception of “dominant” at hand (in retention) and perceives measure 12 as a challenge to the “dominant,” in the context of measures 9–12. The specific context is crucial; we are not talking about measures 12–13, or measures 12–15, or measures 9–15, and so on. One might ask why the context of measures 9–12, that is the ConteXT for \( p_2 \), is well-formed, considering the strong phrase articulation between the second quarter of measure 11 and the pickup to measure 12. That is a good question. To address it in my own hearing, I would point to the persistence of the G root over all four measures, and also to the persistence of the pitch D5 in the principal melodic voice, from the vocal cadence in measure 10 through the entire vocal part of measure 12. In making this response, I refine the pair \( (V\text{-percept, questioning}) \) to at least three component pairs: \( (5\text{th-degree-root-percept, prolongation}), (D5\text{-melody-percept, prolongation}), \) and \( (\text{leading-tone-percept, denial}) \). The statements I would make about this state of affairs are covered symbolically by the graphic format of Figure 4.8.2. On that example, the V root and melodic D5 have prolongational slurs leading into their symbolic representations. The denial of the leading-tone function is depicted by the flat-symbol on the figuration for the harmony. A question mark and exclamation point after the flat symbol express confusion about the denial of leading-tone function in a context that otherwise clearly prolongs “dominant” sensations.

Some critical readers may be saying impatiently, “Why all this fuss about a confusing role for the event of measure 12 in a context that bridges a large phrase articulation very awkwardly? Why go to such trouble to perceive the harmony as a confusing minor-V, when it is so clear as iv-of-ii within its own phrase boundary?” The remainder of Part III will satisfy such critics, I hope, making it clear why I want to construct \( p_2 \) and assert it as a significant perception here. For the time being, we can note that our model will accommodate very well the hostile reactions of these critics upon being confronted by \( p_2 \). The model analyzes their denial-of-\( p_2 \) as itself something-we-perceive in the music. We perceive it specifically when we hear measure 12 as the beginning of a new phrase in a context which both continues “normally” and, also, retains our impression of \( p_2 \) (so that \( p_2 \) is around to be attacked).

Perception \( p_{3a} \) in Example 4.7, hears measure 12 “as the beginning of a new phrase . . . which . . . continues ‘normally,’” and Perception \( p_{3b} \) extends the ConteXT for \( p_{3a} \) backwards so as to be able to retain (and attack) \( p_2 \). The pair \( (p_2, \text{denial}) \) appears on the P-R-LIST for \( p_{3b} \). The critics’ denial is \( p_{3b} \)’s denial.

\( p_{3b} \) hears the EVents of measures 12–13 in their own ConteXT. The musical phrase of measures 12–13 coincides with one complete verse of the text; that is part of the EVent and part of the ConteXT. The outer voices and the harmony implied by the ConteXT are portrayed by the symbolic STatement of Example 4.8.3. In this
ConteXT, the harmony of measure 12 is iv\(^6\) of d minor. d minor, in this context (mm. 12–13) is not ii-of-C major; there is no hint of C major tonality in the context of the two measures themselves. Example 4.8.3 suggests the way in which \(p_{3b}\) denies \(p_2\) by the annotation “not V\(^6\)!”

Beyond Example 4.8.3, we will also want to image on the STatement-LISTS for \(p_{3a}\) and \(p_{3b}\) various other STatements involving various Perception-Relations on their P-R-LISTS. For instance we might STate, on hearing measures 12–13 in their own context, “Oh, now I hear where that g minor six-chord is going.” That STatement involves \textit{inter alia} the pair \((p_1,\text{incipital inclusion})\), a pair on the P-R-LIST of \(p_{3a}\). The time-span of \(p_{3a}\) continues the time-span of \(p_1\), the span in which one perceives “that g minor six-chord.” We might also STate, on hearing measures 12–13 in their own context, “d minor is being tonicized.” This STatement involves a mentally constructed d minor tonic, at measure 14 or thereabouts, on which the dominant-of-d in measure 13 will discharge. The mental construction is symbolized in Example 4.8.4, a sketch that pertains to a perception \(p_4\), a perception of the tonicization satisfied in protension. The pair \((p_4,\text{implication})\) appears on the P-R-LIST for \(p_{3a}\) and of course the pair \((p_{3a},\text{realization})\) appears on the P-R-LIST for \(p_4\).

On listening to measures 12–13 in the context of measures 9–13, we might also STate, “Aha! So the g minor six chord is \textit{not} a confusing minor dominant of C major; it is rather iv-of-ii in a C-major progression that tonicizes ii.” This STatement, the Statement of the Critical Readers, can be imagined on the ST-LIST for \(p_{3b}\). The pairs \((p_2,\text{denial})\) and \((p_{3a},\text{reinforcement})\) accordingly appear on the P-R-LIST for \(p_{3b}\).

In connection with the Critical Readers, one would put on the ST-LIST of \(p_{3b}\) additional statements, for example: “There is a big phrase boundary between measure 11 and the pickup to measure 12.”

Perception \(p_4\) hears the d minor tonic that we expect to continue from the EVents of measures 12–13. We discussed earlier the pairs \((p_4,\text{implication})\) and \((p_{3a},\text{realization})\) on the P-R-LISTS for \(p_{3a}\) and \(p_4\), respectively. The recursive structure is by now familiar. The d minor tonic event in Example 4.8.4 appears with diamond-shaped noteheads; this symbolizes its contingency in protension only, so far as the STatement being made is concerned; Example 4.8.4 STates \textit{inter alia} that the events of measures 12–13 are about to discharge on a constructed d minor tonic event.

The mentally constructed d minor tonic here interrelates with a d minor harmony we heard earlier. That harmony was tonicized via a fleeting C\# in the vocal line of measure 8, the first chromatic note of the song. \(p_4\) thus expands and elaborates upon an earlier perception of tonicized-d. The pair (earlier d tonicization, elaboration) appears on the P-R-LIST for \(p_4\). It would be more exact to introduce in this connection a new perception \(p_{4a}\) whose ConteXT includes measure-8-in-retention as well as measures 12–13 and 14-in-protension.

Perception \(p_3\) models our effort to make sense of tonicized-d-minor (\(p_4\)) following directly upon a prolonged dominant-of-C perceived over measures 9–11.

26. Example 4.8.3 should technically be annotated some more to show how \(p_{3b}\), perceiving C major tonality in its larger context, would analyze the harmony in the key of “C\#ii,” rather than in the key of d.
We hear that the melodic D5 of measure 13, the D5, which also figures as the diamond-shaped goal of melodic tonicization in Example 4.8.4, prolongs the D5 where the voice signed off in measure 10, a D5 introduced and cadenced on as the fifth of the dominant harmony there. And the other diamond-shaped note of Example 4.8.4, the D4 that is the fundamental bass for the tonicization there, can be heard as part of a bass arpeggiation within the dominant harmony. Hearing these things, we expect that the tonicized d minor of p4 (of Example 4.8.4), having arisen in a larger context as an elaboration of dominant harmony, will again return to dominant harmony. The statement made by the preceding sentence is elaborated and symbolically sketched in Example 4.8.5, to which reference is made on the ST-LIST for p5. The diamond-shaped notes on the example portray contextual elements we construct protensively on hearing the EVents of measures 9–13. A slur extends to the right of the melodic D5 within the ii harmony; that symbol suggests that we mentally prolong the melodic D5 through the protensive dominant-of-C that follows; the slurred D5 thereby resumes its earlier role as fifth-of-a-dominant-harmony. Example 4.8.5 embeds Example 4.8.4 within its middle, and the larger progression “makes good sense” of the smaller. Our model reflects these observations by putting the pairs (p4,medial inclusion) and (p4,reinforcement) on the P-R-LIST for p5. That P-R-LIST also contains the pairs (p3b, reinforcement) and (p2,virtual annihilation). That is to say, p5 (Example 4.8.5) continues and mightily intensifies the denial of p4 that began with the construction of p3b. On Example 4.8.5, the bracket, the parentheses, and the filled-in noteheads suggest how the g minor six-chord is here perceived as completely forward-looking, inflecting a subsequent (protensive) d minor harmony; in this perception, the g minor chord has no direct prolongational relation to the dominant harmony that precedes it. p5, perceiving these things about the g minor six-chord, perceives that p2-is-virtually-annihilated.27 Perception p6a addresses our hearing how the EVents of measure 14, in the ConteXT of measures 12–14, confirm and elaborate the earlier perception p4. (p4,confirmation and elaboration) appears on the P-R-LIST for p6a. Example 4.8.6 confirms and elaborates Example 4.8.4 in three stages labeled (a), (b), and (c). Stage (a) shows the protensive d minor tonic of Example 4.8.4 arriving; the inner voices of the mentally constructed triad are filled in. Stage (b) inflects the top voice of stage (a) by a (passing) seventh. Stage (c) inverts the voices of stage (b), leaving the passing seventh in the melody; stage (c) also replaces the A natural in the harmony of stages (a) and (b) by the chromatic variant A flat. The bass, alto, and so-

27. When I refer to “the g minor chord,” I demonstrate the utility of having earlier constructed p4 to reference such a mental object. p4, which is constructed in the ConteXT of measure-12-by-itself, enables me to refer to a “g minor chord” that is neither a “minor dominant of C major” nor a “subdominant of d minor.” Then I can use my language L effectively, to say that p4 hears the g minor chord as a subdominant of d (= ii/C), not as a minor dominant of C. If I substitute “the subdominant of d” for “the g minor chord” in the preceding sentence, I make p4 hear tautologically in my language L. If I substitute “the minor dominant of C” for “the g minor chord” in the same sentence, I make p4 hear in a linguistically erroneous fashion. Classical theories of consonance and/or triadic root-functionality are very relevant to my claim, that I can perceive “the g minor chord” in its own context. (It does not require “preparation” and/or “resolution” in any larger context, in order to have a traditional “meaning.”)
prano voices of stage (c) are projected by the actual acoustic signals of measure 14. The persisting diamond-shaped D4 of stage (c) is a mental construct; it represents the discharge of the d minor tonicization on the harmony of measure 14 as a permissible representative for a d minor root function. The harmony of stage (c) is thus perceived (by perception p6a) as an inverted and chromatically altered d7 chord, the d being mentally constructed in the Context of measures 12–14.

Perceiving the C5 of Example 4.8.6 as a “passing seventh” within a constructed d harmony in a context of d tonicity, we will construct another perception protensively, a perception that hears the “passing” accomplished. Perception p6b puts 6a together, in this way, with the expectation of B♭4 to come in the melody and G3 to come in the bass, presumably at measure 15. (p6b, implication) appears on the P-R-LIST for p6a. G3 and B♭4 are specifically implied by p6a as follows. The A♭ in the acoustic bass of measure 14 is perceived by p6a as dissonant, a diminished fifth of a d harmony. It should therefore resolve, we expect, to G3 in the bass of measure 15. The C in the melody of acoustic measure 14 is likewise perceived by p6a as dissonant, a passing seventh. It should therefore resolve, we expect, to B♭4 in the melody of measure 15. We expect B♭ rather than B natural, because the Context for p6a includes a presumption of contextual d minor tonicity, as a theoretical-psychological component. That aspect of p6a’s Context is explicitly noted in Example 4.7. We imagine the symbolic Statements for p6b to include Example 4.8.6 followed by a diamond-shaped B♭4-over-G3 at hypothetical-measure-15.

Perception p6b has on its P-R-LIST the pair (p6a, realization). p6b also has on its P-R-LIST a pair (p7a, modification). The perception p7a addresses the same Events in the same temporal Context as p6b, that is the events of measure 14 in the context of measures 12–14 plus an expected measure 15. But p7a expects quite different things from p6b. What p7a expects is symbolized by Example 4.8.7. As the example shows, p7a expects both the outer voices to step down from measure 14 to measure 15; in this p7a agrees with p6b. p7a, however, does not expect to continue “in d minor” past measure 14, and it awaits B natural, not B flat, in the melody of measure 15. In those expectations p7a disagrees with p6b. So the two temporally co-extensive perceptions modify each other. The pair (p6b, modification) appears on the P-R-LIST for p7a.

p7a expects B natural, not B flat, and p7a is not concerned with maintaining a d minor context, because the perception is listening for sequential patterns in its Context. This feature of the perception is symbolized by the annotation “(seq.)” in the CXT column of Example 4.7. Perceiving the acoustic signal of measure 14 in the context of measures 12–14, p7a recognizes that the text of measure 14 is analo-

28. Idiomatic harmony in d minor for the B♭-over-G, consistent with the level of complexity introduced into that key by stage (c) of Example 4.8.6, is quite conceivable. For instance, the B♭-over-G could be harmonized by ivv, giving rise to an elaboration of p6a through the following progression: ivv(m12), V(m13), i♭(m. 14 as stage(c) of Example 4.8.6), ivv (harmonizing the protensive B♭-over-G at hypothetical-measure-15), V♭2, i♭, and so on.

The harmonic exercise is not sheer pedantry. Our “language L” includes the discourse of traditional tonal theory, and the urge to work out a reasonable harmonization is the urge to show that the Statement of p6b involving B♭-over-G in d minor is in fact a grammatical (i.e., possible) construction in the language L.
gous to the text of measure 12 in a context where a complete sentence underlay measures 12–13; p7a also recognizes that the acoustic harmony of measure 14 has the same intervallic structure as the acoustic harmony of measure 12. Accordingly, p7a expects that measure 15 will continue from measure 14 by analogy with the way measure 13 continued from measure 12: measure 15 will finish the sentence begun in measure 14, and measures 14–15 will project the progression iv\(^6\) V in “c minor” just as measures 12–13 projected the same progression in d minor.

p7a in its context (Example 4.8.7) thus perceives p3a (Example 4.8.3) becoming expanded sequentially. The pair (p3a\_sequential expansion) appears on the P-R-LIST for p7a. Example 4.8.7 asserts a local tonic of c minor, not C major, for measures 14-and-expected-15. That is because c minor, not C major, is the literal sequential analog for the d minor tonic of p3a (measures 12–13); p7a knows nothing of any larger context involving C major tonality. Example 4.8.7 has a question mark on the progression from its “d minor” of measures 12–13 to its “c minor” of measures 14–15; there is no traditional tonal syntax that makes the progression “logical,” especially at the transition from a cadential dominant of d in measure 13 to a subdominant of c in measure 14. It would not help the “logic” much to invoke C major in this connection. The problem is that p7a perceives the harmony of measure 14 as a subdominant of c (or C), and that function has no clear relation in the context (of p7a) to the dominant of d which precedes it.

p7a thereby modifies p6b in yet another way. For p6b senses nothing problematic about the progression from measure 13 to measure 14. p6b perceives V of d progressing very logically to a substitute harmony for a d tonic triad, as indicated in stages (a)-(b)-(c) of Example 4.8.6 earlier. The intermodifications of P7a and p6b in this connection involve something like Rameau’s double emploi brought into our present model. In one perception, p7a, the acoustic signal of measure 14 signifies an “f chord.” In another perception, p6b—the same stimulus signifies a “d chord.” The perceptions p7a and p6b that carry these significations address events and contexts that are coextensive in cursor-time: both involve the EV ents of measure 14 in the ConteXT of measures 12–14 plus an expected measure 15.

To say these things about the two distinct mental objects (or acts), that is about p7a and p6b, is very different from having to assert that there is one acoustic object, “the chord of measure 14,” which “is” both an f chord and a d chord “at the same time.” I put “is” and “at the same time” in quotation marks to draw special attention to the inadequacy of traditional temporal parlance here, which speaks as if the cursor-time over which measure 14 extends were the only temporal frame involved in our constructing, processing, and interrelating the two mental objects p6b and p7a. I shall have much more to say on such methodological points during Part IV.

Perception p7b notices that the acoustic signal continues from measures 12–14 through acoustic measure 15 according to the protensive model of p7a to a dominant of c (or C) with B natural, not B flat, in the melody. Thus, (p7a\_confirmation) appears on its P-R-LIST. The acoustic event of measure 15 denies the protensive B flat that p6b constructed for its (expected) measure 15. Accordingly, the pair (p6b\_denial) appears on the P-R-LIST for p7b. p7b, however, deny p6a. Indeed, it uses the d root of p6a to confirm the expectations of p5: p7b perceives that the diamond-shaped notes of Example 4.8.5 are in fact eventuating over the acoustic sig-
nal of measures 14–15 just as \( p_7 \) had imagined they would, the \( d \)-chord of \( p_5 \) being represented by the acoustic signal of measure 14 according to the perception of \( p_{6a} \) (Example 4.8.6). This activity on the part of \( p_{7b} \) is symbolized by the pair (\( p_5 \), confirmation (via \( P_{6a} \))), which appears on its P-R-LIST.

In confirming both \( p_{7a} \) and \( p_{5} \)-cum-\( p_{6a} \) the perception \( p_{7b} \) confirms both the \( f \) chord in measure 14 of \( p_{7a} \) and the \( d \) chord in measure 14 of \( p_{5} \)-cum-\( p_{6a} \). Our model has no problem in handling this logic, since “the \( f \) chord in measure 14 of \( p_{7a} \)” and “the \( d \) chord in measure 14 of \( p_{5} \)” are different objects in our model; “the diamond-shaped \( d \)-chord in protensive measure 14 of \( p_{5} \)” is yet another object. \( p_{7b} \) notices that measure 15, in its text and its acoustic signal, does complete the parallelism of measures 14–15 with measures 12–13 according to the protensive model of \( p_{7a} \); measure 14 of \( p_{7a} \) is a subdominant of the local tonic that governs measures 14–15, just as measure 12 is a subdominant of the local tonic that governs measures 12–13. \( p_{7b} \) also perceives that the protensive constructions of \( p_5 \) (Example 4.8.5) do in fact come to pass over measures 12–15, via the mental processing of \( p_{6a} \) (Example 4.8.6) that allows the signal of measure 14 to be perceived as a \( d \) harmony. There is no logical contradiction in any of this: we are not saying that \( p_{7b} \) perceives one object as “both an \( f \) chord and a \( d \) chord at the same time.”

Perception \( p_8 \) puts the \( A♭–G \) in the bass of measures 14–15 into a broad enough context so that the gesture can be heard as an expanded recapitulation of the \( A♭–G \) in the bass of measure 9. A P-R pair for \( p_8 \) expresses the relationship. Example 4.8.8 makes a symbolic statement about ways in which the two approaches to G-in-the-bass are similar. In the broad context of measures 9–15 we identify both Gs as dominants of C major; Example 4.8.8 labels the two dominants. \( p_8 \) should thereby be understood to enter into suitable Perception-Relations (not shown in Example 4.7) with \( p_5 \). \( p_5 \) (Example 4.8.5) heard the span of measures 9–15 as an elaboration of dominant harmony in C major, and \( p_8 \) (Example 4.8.8) now supports the notion, and is supported by it.

Example 4.7 does not include our earlier perception of \( A♭–G \) in the bass at measure 9. Intuitively, we can notice many accented aspects of the gesture; these intuitions could be reflected by suitable Perception-Relations and Statements if we wanted to work them out formally for our model. We notice, for instance, that the bass line and harmony move in dotted half notes from the voice entrance up to the \( A♭ \) of measure 9, at which event the bass or the harmony start to move in quarters (as does the accompaniment texture). We notice the unusually great acoustic dissonance and the chordal chromaticism in the harmony over the \( A♭ \) of measure 9, given the context of measures 5–9 (or of measures 1–9). We notice the leap of the bass into the \( A♭ \) of measure 9, as contrasted with the essentially conjunct motion of the bass during measures 5–8. We notice that the G in the bass of measure 9 is the first large-scale dominant of the strophe (and of the piece); it is the melodic and rhythmic goal of the bass line in the context of measures 5–11. We notice that the vocal F at the bar line of measure 9, a tone prolonged above the \( A♭–G \) gesture in the bass there, is the melodic climax of the vocal line in the context of measures 5–9, and of measures 5–11. We notice that this vocal F is dissonant over its essential bass, the G of measure 9. We notice that the vocal F sets a subjunctive verb. If we pursue the matter, we shall notice curious things about the nonresolving
pseudo-resolutions of that F in the context of measures 5–11, and curious things about the dramatic irony of the text in that connection, an irony which makes the contrary-to-factness of the subjunctive itself contrary to fact: “as if something were the matter”—as if nothing were the matter!

Such observations, and others like them, enrich the P-R-LIST and ST-LIST of the earlier A♭–G perception that engages the EVents of measure 9; thereby p₈ is itself indirectly enriched. And thereby further salient perceptions, pursuant to these matters, could be added to Example 4.7. For instance, we shall now certainly notice in the Context of measures 5–15 how the “dominant” EVents of measures 9–15 elaborate the subjunctive verb of measure 9 by a series of questions: each verse of text that closes during measures 9–15 ends with a question mark. It is possible therewith to hear the high F of the voice in measure 9 essentially still unresolved at measure 15, an understood “questioning” dominant seventh within the large-scale dominant elaboration at hand. This perception is confirmed by the acoustic signal of measures 16–17, where the high vocal F resolves to a high vocal E in a matching rhythmic motive, as the large-scale dominant harmony resolves to a large-scale tonic and the subjunctive doubt resolves into obligation. To bring out the last-mentioned relationship, Schubert displaces the natural text stresses in setting the rhyming verses 3 and 6 of the poem: he sets “als wär’ dir (was geschehen)” and “so muß ich (wieder gehen),” not “als wär’ dir was geschehen” and “so muß ich wieder gehen.”

Example 4.8.8 indicates succinctly how the “dominant” region of the strophe, measures 9–15, is also the “chromatic” region of the strophe; this large-scale dominant is thematically bound up with the chromaticism, as much as it is with contrary-to-fact questioning and the unresolved high F of measure 9. Consequently, perception p₈ supports another perception p₉ that projects a more chromatic interpretation of the large-scale dominant than we have hitherto examined. The pair (p₉, support) appears on the P-R-LIST for P₈.

Example 4.8.9 sketches a symbolic statement for p₉, engaging the EVents of measures 9–15 in their own Context along with the ContexT of the protensive resolution to follow at expected-measure-16. As Example 4.8.9 hears things, the harmonic function of “that g minor chord” in measure 12 is not iv-of-ii after all,

29. N.B.: the youth does not “go.” Rather he repeats and extends “I must go” over the remainder of the strophe. Even then he does not go, but remains to sing three more strophes. My unpublished typescript analyzes and interrelates these matters, along with the concomitant E–D–C round between voice and piano, that sets “so muß ich wieder gehen.” In my analysis, the round expands into recurrent large-level descents from the vocal E of measure 16 and so on in one strophe, through the vocal D of measure 10–12 in the next strophe, to the vocal C of measure 17 and so on in that next strophe. The E of measure 16-in-that-next-strophe reasserts itself over that C just as the E in the foreground round reasserts itself, in one instrument or the other, over the C in the foreground round. The music for the strophe goes around four times, as does the foreground round-motive within each strophe. The youth can only go when the sense of obligation, the muß, has been attached to the act of going, the gehen. That happens only when the background E of muß, measure 16, is linearly connected in the background to the background C of gehen, measure 17. The background connection is not accomplished during measures 16–17 of any one strophe; the background line emerges only as the strophes repeat again and again, going wieder through the D of measures 10–12. The more often we pass the E of measure 16, as the strophes go around, the less accent we hear the next time around on the neighboring high F of measure 9; the more structural weight, correspondingly, do we feel on the D of measures 10–12.
but, rather, minor-v-just as \( p_2 \) originally thought it was. According to the figure at hand, the \( B♭ \) in the bass of measure 12 is not a sixth degree of a local tonic \( d \) minor, about to resolve as an appoggiatura to the \( A \) natural in the bass of measure 13, the fifth degree of that \( d \) minor. Rather, the \( B♭ \) in the bass of measure 12 is a chordal tone, a chromatically altered member of a large-scale \( G \) harmony that controls measures 9–15; the \( A \) natural in the bass at measure 13 does not resolve the \( B♭ \) but passes chromatically away from it, in transit to \( A♭ \). The flatted notes on Example 4.8.9 behave as scale degrees borrowed from \( c♭ \) minor: flat-6 at measure 14 moves idiomatically to 5, and flat-7 at measure 12 steps down idiomatically to flat-6 at measure 14 (via the nonessential passing event of measure 13).

In Example 4.8.9, a slur binds the motive \( G–B♭–A♭–G \). This is the minor version of the “Müllerin” motive from the voice in measure 6. In the foreground, the music moves from tonic harmony at the vocal entrance (measure 5) to dominant harmony (measure 6); the foreground dominant is then prolonged by the Müllerin motive. Just so, the music moves on a larger scale from tonic harmony at the beginning of each strophe to the big dominant harmony at measure 9; \( p_9 \) then hears that big dominant prolonged by the (minor) Müllerin motive as depicted under the slur of Example 4.8.9.

The pair \((p_2,\text{confirmation})\) is a characteristic member of the P-R-LIST for \( p_9 \): what-\( p_9 \)-perceives includes the perception that \( p_2 \) does (did) in fact make sense, even though it was (is) “denied” by \( p_{3b} \) and “virtually annihilated” by \( p_5 \). We do not have to have recourse to “posthumous rehabilitation” here. \( p_2 \) is not necessarily “really” dead, just because \( p_{3b} \) and \( p_5 \) honestly perceived it as dying and dead. We are now somewhere else, perceiving something else along with \( p_9 \). To put the matter more elegantly: \( p_2, p_{3b}, p_5, \) and \( p_9 \) are not all cohabiting the same phenomenological place at the same phenomenological time. They are different objects (or acts) in different parts of phenomenological space-time, exercising a variety of interrelationships as reflected in our model by a variety of P-R pairs. I shall discuss the methodological point at greater length during Part IV. Meanwhile, we can note that \( p_9 \), in confirming \( p_2 \), denies \( p_{3b} \). The pair \((p_{3b},\text{denial})\) appears on the P-R-LIST for \( p_9 \); \( p_9 \) will be recalled, denied (denies) \( p_2 \) by STating: “Aha! That g minor chord is not a confusing dominant of \( C \); it is rather iv-of-ii in a progression tonicizing ii.” \( p_{3b} \) utters this while listening to the E\( V \)ents of measures 12–13 in the Cont\( e \)XT of measures 9–13. \( p_9 \) in turn denies \( p_{3b} \) by STating: “Doch, doch! The g minor chord \( is \) a minor dominant of \( C \), a questioning, doubting, chromatic, blue dominant arpeggiating the \( G \) root which set in at measure 9.” \( p_9 \) utters this while listening to the E\( V \)ents of measures 9–15 in their own Cont\( e \)XT, anticipating also a protensive measure 16. In thus denying a denial, \( p_9 \) mirrors neatly the contrary-to-fact construction in the text that we examined earlier: “as if something were wrong”—as if nothing were wrong.

The pair \((p_8,\text{support})\) appears on the P-R-LIST for \( p_9 \); these two perceptions mutually reinforce each other. The P-R-LIST also contains the pair \((p_5,\text{qualification})\). The qualification-relationship, to be more useful, should be analyzed into a number of components. \( p_9 \) and \( p_5 \) reinforce each other in that both perceive measures 9–15 as an elaboration of dominant harmony in \( C \). (Compare Example 4.8.9 with Example 4.8.5.) \( p_9 \) and \( p_5 \) disagree, however, as to the manner of the elabora-
tion; their disagreement is reflected in the differing symbols that appear in Examples 4.8.9 and 4.8.5 around measures 12–14, symbols that have been amply discussed already. The reader may wish to review in this connection our earlier exposition of how \( p_5 \) “virtually annihilated” \( p_2 \); \( p_9 \) takes a longer view than \( p_5 \), but that does not mean that \( p_5 \) “did not happen” or “was wrong,” any more than \( p_2 \) “did not happen” or “was wrong” when \( p_5 \) took a longer view and virtually annihilated it. The urge to deny or otherwise bad-mouth some of one’s own “inconvenient” perceptual experiences in this sort of situation will be discussed during Part IV.

**Part IV: Methodology**

We have already started to note and discuss the ways in which our model enables us to bypass certain false dichotomies in analytic discourse, dichotomies that arise when we implicitly but erroneously suppose that we are discussing one phenomenon at one location in phenomenological space-time, when in fact we are discussing many phenomena at many distinct such locations. We can review the point by inspecting the “political/legal” table shown in Example 4.9.

**Example 4.9**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrat/plaintiff (bzw Republican and/or defendant)</th>
<th>Republican/defendant (bzw Democrat and/or plaintiff)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(a) the g-minor harmony of measure 12 in *Morgengrub* is

- \( v \) of \( C \) major (or \( c \) minor).
- \( iv \) of \( d \) minor.

(b) The B flat of measure 12 is

- a chordal third of g:
  - \( \frac{3}{2} \)-of-\( g \) = \( \frac{3}{2} \)-of-(cv) = \( \frac{3}{2} \)-of-c.

(c) The A in the bass of measure 13 is

- accessory: it passes chromatically from B flat (m12) to A flat (m14) within a descending c-minor scale segment that aims for the G of measure 15.
- chordal: it resolves the appoggiatura of (b) above; it carries the harmony V-of-d.

(d) The harmony of measure 14 is

- an f-minor chord, iv of c/C.
- a d-minor tonic harmony, with seventh and altered fifth, inverted.

(e) The biggest musical articulation between measure 5 and measure 16 is

- at measure 9, where the chromatic, questioning dominant of C is attained, with its subjunctive 7th, the event is prolonged in all those respects until m16, where the chromaticism and the questions vanish, and the vocal high F resolves to vocal high E as V resolves to I.

- at measure 12, where the second phrase of the musical strophe and the second half of the text stanza begin after a strong phrase-articulation involving a long rest in the vocal part.
When we contemplate such political/legal dichotomies, whether introspectively or in debate with other analysts, the discomforts we feel are symptoms of a deficiency in traditional analytic discourse. These discomforts arise whenever we make, about a listening experience, any statement of syntactic form, “The X is . . .” To take a specific case, when we begin Example 4.9(a) by saying, “The harmony of measure 12 is . . . ,” we are already falsely constraining our musical perceptions by implicitly asserting that there is one phenomenological object called “the harmony of measure 12,” and we are also constraining our perceptions by saying of this object that it “is,” putting it at one location in one present-tense system that renders falsely coextensive a number of different times: the historical time in which the piece continues to exist for its listeners and performers, every time in which an acoustic signal projects the score of measure 12, the time during which a listener may be forming and processing perception $p_{1a}$, ditto perception $p_{1b}$, ditto perceptions $p_{2a}$ and $p_{2b}$, ditto perception $p_{3a}$ or $p_{3b}$, or $p_{8}$ or $p_{9}$, and so on, and the time in which I am now writing this sentence, and the time in which you are now reading it. Our model makes us nicely sensitive to the differences among what-happens-in-measure-12-as-a-constituent-part-of-$p_{1}$, ditto $p_{2}$, ditto $p_{3}$, and the rest. These are different formal objects within the model, not one object called “the harmony of measure 12.” Likewise, our model makes us sensitive to the way in which perception-structures $p_{i}$ can occupy different mental and/or clock times. Even when $p_{1}$ and $p_{j}$ impinge upon us at the same mental or clock time, our model allows them to do so separately; indeed, $p_{i}$ might have the pair $(p_{i}, \text{denial})$ on its P-R-LIST while $p_{j}$ simultaneously had $(p_{j}, \text{denial})$ on its P-R-LIST. We discussed earlier how EVALuation of the infinite loop might proceed to termination during this time: a higher-level parser could mentally process the loop prior to EVALuation, arranging for a suitable exit, or else a signal external to mental processing could interrupt and override EVALuation according to some prestructured configuration of the mental system.

Any phenomenological theory should also make us sensitive to the necessity for conceptually distinguishing among various “occupational” times like those mentioned earlier: the time in which measure 12 “is” as I now think about it while writing this article, the time in which measure 12 “is” as you now think about it while reading the article some months later-by-the-clock, the time in which measure 12 “is” when a pianist and a vocalist create a pertinent acoustic signal by certain psychophysical activities, the time in which measure 12 “is” when a listener in a recital hall receives that acoustic signal via certain psychophysical activities, ditto a listener listening to a recording at home—for the first time, the second time, the Nth time, and so on. Each of these occupational contexts builds a different family of mental constructs for perceiving the passage of time, and a phenomenologist will not assume a priori that the time-systems are all functionally isomorphic. Indeed, the transformations that map each occupational time system into the others

30. The metaphor of an obligatory interrupt works well in analyzing Morgengrauβ, when we sense the psychological immanence of the structural downbeat at measure 16. The signal tells us “it is time to be moving on” from the chromatic/dominant/questioning imbroglio of measures 9–15, an impasse portrayed nicely in this reading by the fermata of measure 15. The downbeat moves us on by its high-level rhythmic position, its tonic harmony, its high vocal E, and its new verb müß.
should be presumed quite complex, since they ought to reflect both the autonomy and the interdependence of the various activities.

I have called my false dichotomies political/legal because they force us into the position of voting for a slate of candidates, or of rendering verdicts in adversary judicial proceedings, as we respond to music. I find this not just wrong but fantastically wrong. My own meta-methodology includes these rules for analysis: mistrust anything that tells you not to explore an aural impression you have once formed; mistrust anything that tells you not to listen any more to music that once gripped you, as soon as you have heard one thing going on (or two things, or three, four, . . . five hundred . . . things). The false dichotomies run head-on against my meta-rules, and I find the phenomenology of the model an attractive way to avoid the dichotomies without abandoning rational discourse.

The dichotomies illustrate well the kinds of snares and pitfalls the mind is wont to lay for the ear, not so much in connection with the formal constraints of this or that theory—these are usually easy to notice—but much more in connection with our unexamined common habits, habits like our sloppiness in using the words “the” and “is.” Another such common habit is our too facile recourse to the Euclidean plane in connection with representational modeling, a recourse often concealed in our taking for granted the useful metaphors of the page and of received notations.

To illustrate the treacherous aspects of our penchant for the Euclidean plane, one need only glance at a score of Morgengruß. There one will see within a portion of a Euclidean plane a certain unique notehead at the bar line of measure 12 in the left hand of the piano; this notehead appears to reference a unique “point” of the plane, a point with a unique vertical coordinate and a unique horizontal coordinate in the Cartesian representation of the plane. The geometric metaphors contribute enormously to the fallacious idea that there is one unique object called “the B flat of measure 12,” an object that impinges on us at one unique phenomenological time, the time in which the B flat “is.” Our fallacious sense of one object at a unique spatial location is prompted by the unique vertical coordinate for the B flat notehead-point on the Euclidean/Cartesian score-plane. Our fallacious sense that only one musical time is involved, in only one musical time-system, is prompted by the unique horizontal coordinate for the same notehead-point in the same notational geometry, and by the one-dimensional representation of time in that notation. In the same mode of understanding, a certain creature that we fallaciously imagine as “the harmony of measure 14” is suggested by a certain visual configuration of adjacent points in the plane; this configuration spans and is (essentially) bounded by the vertical lines that frame the representation of “measure 14” as a connected region in Euclidean space. The one-dimensional span that is the projection of that region on the horizontal axis of the Cartesian plane is also connected; it suggests a unique “time” (span) in which we fallaciously suppose our harmony “is.” Fallaciously embracing the geometric metaphors, we conclude “logically” enough about our phenomena [sic] that “it” [sic] cannot be both an f harmony and a d harmony “at the same time.” And so we begin trying to deny and suppress various of our perceptual phenomena [sic], not realizing that our conceptual tools are inadequate for the analytic task at hand.
Our model helps us to abandon, along with the dichotomies, certain misleading expressions of the species “merely/only/naught but/simply/ . . . ” These utterances help us to dismiss inconvenient perceptions as inconsequential. The linguistic mannerism creeps all too seductively into our prose and—worse—into our mental habits as we think about our responses to music. When we fall into such discourse, the puzzling $g$ minor harmony in measure 12, apparently an inconvenient minor dominant in $C$, turns out to be “naught but” the beginning of a cadence in $d$ minor ($= ii$-of-$C$); but then that event, on a yet larger level, turns out to be “merely” part of a large elaboration of $v$-of-$C$ after all. In this discourse, we shall now notice first of all a malformation: “The . . . $g$ minor harmony . . . to be . . . .” But we can now also notice the way in which the expressions “naught but” and “merely” sneak in, so that we are enabled to push away some of our perceptions at the expense of others, again as if voting or arriving at a verdict. The expressions tell us not to explore further certain aural impressions that once gripped us; the parlance violates my meta-methodology.

True, we will modify our perceptions as we listen through a piece, extending their P-R-LISTS, creating new perceptions in retrospect that may “deny” old ones, and so forth. Perhaps we perform even more radical acts of mental surgery on them. We can certainly modify our perceptions, too, during the time in which we come to know a piece more richly. All this is perfectly reasonable. Indeed, our model has given us good examples of the process at work, for example, in $p_9$’s modifying $p_5$’s modifying $P_{31}$’s modifying $P_2$, both as we listen to the passage and as we come to analyze it more deeply. What is not reasonable is any concomitant urge to deny or bad-mouth perceptions we are coming to modify. The defensive anxiety that underlies such an urge is a good clue that there is unresolved psychological business at hand, that the attention of the ear is being busily directed away from something which the mind wants to leave unacknowledged or unexplored. One thinks of Freud’s Zurückdrängen and Unterdrückung.

When we are using words like “merely” to put down certain of our perceptions, we are likely to call other perceptions “important” or “more important.” Our perception-model enables us to avoid those locutions, too. They are suspect because

31. Freud, Vorlesung zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse (Berlin: Gustave Kiepenheuer Verlag, 1955), 64–65. Joan Riviere, in A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (New York: Washington Square Press, 1952), 68–69, translates zurückgedrängt as “forced back” and Unterdrückung as “suppression.” Neither term means quite the same to Freud as Verdrängung = “repression.” Freud uses the words in connection with his analysis of everyday errors (Fehlleistungen). On the second page of the cited passage, he asserts that “a suppression (Unterdrückung) of a previous intention to say something is an indispensable condition for the occurrence of a slip of the tongue.” On the preceding page, he has told us that the speaker may or may not be aware of the suppressed intention, but in any case “it has been forced back (zurückgedrängt). The speaker had determined not to convert the idea into speech and then . . . the tendency which is debarred from expression asserts itself against his will and gains utterance. . . . This is the mechanism of a slip of the tongue (Versprechen).”

Earlier, Freud classifies many Fehlleistungen as similar to Versprechen in mechanism (Freud, p. 18; Riviere, p. 29). One of the errors is Verhören = mishearing an auditory event. The one who verspricht sich typically remarks: “How stupid of me! Of course I meant to say . . . .” The one who verhört sich typically remarks: “How silly of me! I realize now that what I really heard was . . . .”
they inferentially put down the percepts that are “unimportant” or “less important.” They are also suspect because “importance” is too imprecise a word to be useful in critical discourse. The word casually suggests unspecified criteria of aesthetic value, as if the values had been stated explicitly and the word was descriptive. And—often at the same time—the word can be used carelessly as a synonym for “priority in a syntactic system” or “rank in a formal hierarchy.” The two careless usages, compounding each other, can lead the unwary critic to confuse syntactic priority with aesthetic value, a confusion that is particularly dangerous when one is using Schenkerian or post-Schenkerian music theories. The point is worth two examples.

The first example is literary rather than musical; musicians will more clearly appreciate in a literary context the relations between syntactic function and aesthetic significance. Macbeth, having just murdered Duncan, stares at his bloody hand, which he hardly recognizes, and wonders:

Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No. This my hand will rather
The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red. (Act II, Scene 2)

About the last sentence of this quotation we can formulate a political/legal dichotomy. On the one hand, the word “This,” which is the subject of the sentence, is thereby “more important” than the word “multitudinous,” which is (“merely”) an adjective modifying the object of the verb. On the other hand, “multitudinous” is (“obviously”) “more important” than “This.” “Multitudinous” is a five-syllable word after two verses that—with the exception of “Neptune’s ocean” and “rather”—comprise only monosyllables; it is also a bombastic Latin word after two verses that—again with the exception of “Neptune’s ocean”—comprise only common Saxon words; it is thereby the first crest of a compositional wave that begins to surge up at “rather,” climaxes on “multitudinous,” breaks at “incarnadine,” and subsides through the disyllabic “making” into a dissipating surf of Saxon monosyllables, “the green one red.” The wave tosses up the repeated Saxon monosyllabic motif, “My haND,” and amplifies it into the polysyllabic Latinate surge, “MultituDiNous seas iNcarNaDiNe,” finally echoing off into “Making the greeN oNe reD.”

So should we then vote for “multitudinous” as more important than “This”? No. We are not voting; we should not construct a mental object called “the most important word of the sentence”; we should not predicate of such a mental object the idea that it “is,” at one unique temporal location; finally, “importance” is a useless term here because we are attempting to make it reference two very different categories at the same time. In one usage, “importance” refers to height on a syntactic parsing-tree, and in the other usage, the same term refers to compositional accentuation in a complex poetic phrase.

Naturally, we are more interested in Shakespeare’s compositional procedures, than we are in the fact that his texts usually fit into the paradigms of English syntax. That is not at issue here. What does concern me involves our possibly confus-
ing the fact that Shakespeare wrote English, with the manner in which he did so. The fact does not distinguish him from myriads of English-users whose texts interest us far less; the manner does so distinguish him, and cannot be separated from his “compositional procedures.” So, while it is not interesting that the word “This” is the subject of some abstract English sentence, it is intensely interesting that Shakespeare makes “This,” used as a substantive noun, the subject of the particular sentence whose compositional structure we have been exploring in connection with the multitudinous seas. The grandiose climax of the sentence is not an Event whose significant Contexts and Perception-Relations can be completely excised from contact with the sentence as a whole, from contact in particular with the opening and the subject of the sentence. We do not respond to dramatic poetry by impatiently twiddling our thumbs while the actor gets through the less impressive but unfortunately necessary words, to arrive at the more magnificent and heaven-storming but less “necessary” ones.

An actor who behaves as if we did respond that way will be in trouble. For no audience can possibly miss the “importance” of multitudinous,” while an untrained or insensitive actor can easily blunt the effect of the passage by not sufficiently exploring and projecting to the audience how the word “This” works for the poetry. Specifically, Macbeth has just wondered if the ocean might wash “this blood” clean from “my hand.” He answers, “No.” Then he begins a new thought with the word “This.” We suppose that “This” is an adjective, and that the noun “blood” will follow as before. Or, if the actor makes us feel that “This” is being used as a noun, we suppose that it stands for “This blood.” But as Macbeth continues to speak we do not get the word “blood”; instead we get “This my hand.” Not only will the blood never wash off the hand, even worse: “this blood” and “my hand” have fused into a compact and indissoluble union, this-my-hand, a union for which the appositional form in the syntax is a telling metaphor. Macbeth’s question concerned three distinct objects, the ocean, the blood, and the hand; his answer condenses the objects into two, the blood-hand and the multitudinous seas. Hand and blood fuse into one, as action and guilt fuse into one for the character. The contraction of the hand and the blood into the blood-hand creates a tight knot of energy; this energy is later released by the expansion of the texture into the polysyllables of “multitudinous” and “incarnadine.” (I first became aware of these energy profiles by noticing that I was instinctively clenching my fist as I said “This,” and unclenching it, gradually splaying the fingers of my hand to their widest possible extent, as I intoned the words, “multitudinous seas incarnadine.” I shall say more about such performance-perceptions later, in Part V.)

So, “This” is indeed the dramatic focus of Macbeth’s attention, the poetic subject of Macbeth’s discourse as well as the syntactic subject of his sentence, a subject that becomes—as he stares at it—this blood, this guilt, this hand, and this act all in one, compressed into the taut Saxon monosyllable “This,” the very antithesis of the orotund Latin polysyllable, “multitudinous.” Which word shall we now say is the “more important”? The reader will by now have taken my point: “importance” is not a useful critical expression here, and it particularly misses the mark when it invites us to vote between English sentence-structure and poetic compositional shape.
My second example involves a somewhat analogous critical situation in a musical analysis. In that analysis, a well-formed Schenkerian reading assigns to a certain event a syntactic role as *Kopfton* in an *Urlinie*, apparently ignoring how much “more important” another event sounds. The situation is somewhat analogous to the Shakespeare example because protests about the Schenkerian reading are to some extent methodologically similar to protests about our calling “This” the subject of Macbeth’s sentence, when “multitudinous” is clearly so much “more important.” One can also protest the pertinence of Schenkerian syntax itself, in a way one does not usually protest English syntax, and I will get to *that* methodological issue later on.

The music is Handel’s familiar setting of the carol *Joy to the World*, and the Schenkerian reading is by Allen Forte and Steven E. Gilbert. In connection with this reading the authors bring up a point of Schenkerian syntax: it is not possible to assert a well-formed *Urlinie* that starts on 8, for example, at the word “Joy”; a well-formed *Urlinie* can, however, start on 5, for example, at “world.” This *Urlinie* can descend from 5 to 1 with appropriate support from an *Ursatz* while Heaven and angels sing. In contrast, there is no syntactic support from any well-formed *Ursatz* for a putative descent from 8 (Joy) to 5 (world) within an *Urlinie* that might start on 8. As the authors put it, “the steps between 8 and 5 are . . . over a tonic harmony; this contrasts with the full support given the slow descent from 5 to 1 over the last seven measures.” The melodic gesture of 8-to-5-over-a-tonic-pedal is described by the Schenkerian term, “*Leerlauf*.”

The authors’ analysis might at first seem utterly inconsistent with the tremendous accentual impact of the musical attack on “Joy.” Is not this brilliant impetus the most striking thing about the piece? And in that case, how can one presume to assert that “world” is “more important”? The reader recognizes, I hope, the analogy with “multitudinous” and “This.” In my view, the Schenkerian reading does not claim that “world” is “more important” than “Joy”; rather it asserts that “world” is the *Kopfton* for a well-formed Schenkerian *Ursatz*, much as “This” is the subject of a well-formed English sentence in Macbeth’s speech.

The critic will go on to demand of analysis that it demonstrate the pertinence of such grammatical observations for our perceptions of the artworks at hand. I have tried to produce relevant discussion for the Shakespeare passage in this regard, and I shall now make the same attempt for the Handel piece.

There, the Schenkerian syntax suggests an interesting metaphorical image. Handel’s joy is cosmic. It fills the universe with its radiance, as a divine harmony. It does not move from one location to another. Specifically, it does not leave its heavenly orb and travel to the world through some conductive medium, for example, through some diatonic series articulated in human time, like an *Urlinie*. Rather, it exists in-all-places at-all-times and suffuses all things, the world in particular, with its tonic harmonic resonance. The *Leerlauf* transmits the radiance of this joy as it were like a space heater, through empty space. No conductive medium is necessary. Only in the world, here on 5, can we set about the kind of structural

melodic activity that conducts one event to another through human time. That is, only here and now can a Schenkerian Urlinie get underway, as the upper structural voice of an Ursatz.

These metaphors belong squarely within a conceptual tradition that distinguishes the (harmonic) Music of the Universe from (melodic) Human Music, a tradition extending back to Boethius among music theorists. Zarlino carried the tradition into and through the Renaissance. Handel would have been sensitive to it at least through his relationship with Mattheson. And Schenker’s mature theory reworks the old metaphor into yet another form: he presents his Ursatz as a projection through human time, by idealized human voices, of a categorically prior harmonic structure given by Nature.\footnote{Relevant material from Boethius is translated by Oliver Strunk, \textit{Source Readings in Music History} (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 84–85. Gioseffo Zarlino’s ideas are succinctly discussed by translators Guy Marco and Claude Palisca in Zarlino, \textit{The Art of Counterpoint, Part Three of Le Istitutioni Harmoniche} (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), xviii–xxiv. An eighteenth-century version of the Boethian idea appears in Mattheson, \textit{Der vollkommene Capellmeister} (Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1739), 6; Mattheson’s prose paraphrases the text from Boethius cited here. The article on Mattheson in the \textit{New Grove Dictionary} mentions the long-continuing friendship and mutual influence of Handel and Mattheson. Heinrich Schenker’s remarks about the Ursatz appear in \textit{Free Composition}, trans. and ed. E. Oster (New York: Longman, 1979), 10–11.}

Whatever the relevance or irrelevance of this cultural history, the cosmic metaphor gives us a poetic reading that “makes sense” of the Schenkerian syntax presented by Forte and Gilbert, while also making sense of our natural urge to sing the word “Joy,” in the musical setting, as brilliantly and radiantly as possible. This reading would be helpful to a number of singers and conductors, as a way of drawing their interest and hence their attention to the vocal problem posed by “world”: it is easy for a chorus to run out of steam at this point in the music, after making a slight diminuendo over the first four notes. No self-respecting chorus needs to be told that “Joy” is something special, just as no self-respecting actor needs to be told that “multitudinous” is something special. Most choruses, however, can use some coaching with the delivery of “world” in its context here, just as most actors can use some coaching with their delivery of “This” in context. And it will surely help a chorus to think of “Joy to the world” as one event establishing a harmonic resonance that envelops both the continuing joy and the continuing world, rather than as four events constituting a melodic journey that begins at joy and ends with the world.

A point should be taken up here that was left hanging earlier. We are much freer to reject Schenkerian grammar, as part of a theoretical context in which to make perceptual statements about tonal music, than we are to reject traditional English grammar in connection with English poetry. Such is indeed the case. But, while we are comparatively free to accept or reject this or that music theory as part of a perceptual context, or as part of a language in which to make statements about tonal music, we are not so free to accept or reject the notion of some music theory, or theories, through which we can discuss things traditionally called “tonics,” “dominants,” “strong beats,” “beats,” etc. To the extent that we attribute systematic priority of any kind to such things in tonal music, the sorts of issues we
have been discussing must come up. We shall still have to watch out not to confuse
the assertion of systematic priority, for example, for a tonic or a structural down-
beat, with the vague locution that the corresponding musical event is “more im-
portant” than others.

I have suggested that our urge to make political/legal choices, thereby sup-
pressing certain “less important” perceptions as “naught but” this or that, can be a
psychological pushing-away of material deemed inappropriate or disturbing, a
kind of Zurückdrängung or Unterdrückung. In my own experience, I have always
found it useful and productive to proceed on this assumption, whenever I feel the
urge upon me. But I do not think that Zurückdrängung is its only source. Another
significant factor is our tendency to confuse arguments about the truth and well-
formedness of propositions in the language L, or arguments that urge us to prefer
one such proposition over another in the context of L and the score, with argu-
ments attributing relative value or validity to perceptions themselves. An example
lies at hand from our discussion of “Joy to the World.” In that connection, we can
consider Sentences (a), (b), and (c):

(a) “The Urlinie for a pertinent Ursatz begins on the 8 of ’Joy.’”
(b) “The Urlinie for a pertinent Ursatz begins on the 5 of ‘world.’”
(c) “The Urlinie for a pertinent Ursatz begins on the 3 of ‘And heav’n.’”

Sentence (a) is false; it can be demonstrated false by an appeal to the conven-
tions of Schenkerian language—conventions that define “Urlinie” and “Ursatz”—
along with an appeal to empirical observation directed at a score of the piece—at
the noteheads, and so forth. These appeals involve no listening; they require per-
ception only so far as a person must be able to read English or German text and
musical scores, to understand the logical arguments. A hypothetical “perception”
corresponding to Sentence (a), say \( p_a = (8 \text{ of “Joy,” whole piece, . . . Sentence (a)}) \),
could quite properly be dismissed as “malformed.” Criticism of \( p_a \), however, should
not be directed at some vague and wrong-headed notion that \( p_a \) makes the EEvent
of the opening “Joy” seem “too important.” Rather, criticism should address the
verifiable fact that Sentence (a) is not a true sentence in the understood language L.

Neither Sentence (b) nor Sentence (c) is false, in the sense that Sentence (a) is.
However, the logical conjunction of (b) and (c) is false in that sense: within the lan-
guage L, specific rules tell us that the sentence “(b) and (c)” is false. The truth of
(b) logically entails the falsity of (c), and vice versa.

So much for the logic of sentences (b) and (c) within L. When we construct
corresponding perceptions \( p_b \) and \( p_c \), however, we are not within L. We cannot call
either perception “true” or “false,” even conditional on the other. Both perceptions
are well-formed since, inter alia, neither Sentence (b) nor Sentence (c) is in itself
false (or malformed in L). The matter can stand some elaboration. Let us define the
perceptions as \( p_b = (5 \text{ of “world,” whole piece, . . . (} p_o \text{, denial), . . . Sentence(b)}) \) and
\( p_c = (3 \text{ of “and,” whole piece, . . . (} p_o \text{, denial), . . . Sentence (c)}) \). Since Sentence
(b) and Sentence (c) are mutually exclusive within L, it is impossible to perceive a
well-formed thing called “\( p_b \text{-and-} p_c \)” at one-and-the-same-time in one-and-the-
same-place. But our model does not propose that we consider $p_b$ and $p_c$ to be in the same phenomenological place at the same phenomenological time. Quite the contrary: the model enables us and indeed urges us to articulate different locations for $p_b$ and $p_c$ in phenomenological space-time. Thus, a political/legal dispute over “$p_b$? or $p_c$?” is out of place.

We can rationally argue in a political/legal way over grounds for preferring Sentence (b) to Sentence (c), or vice versa. We can point to aspects of Schenkerian theory, and/or aspects of the score, that make one or the other sentence preferable. Thus, to support a preference for Sentence (b), we could point to the mini-descent from $\hat{5}$ to $\hat{1}$, with full Ursatz-type support from the bass and the harmony, that shapes the first cadence of the music (“... world, the Lord is come”). Or we could point to the lack of bass support under the acoustic attack of the $\hat{3}$ at “And heav’n”; the entrance of the bass voice is delayed so as to support the agogically accented $\hat{5}$ that follows shortly after, on “sing.” And so forth. We can also carry out such an argument by invoking the text of the song. Thus, one might try to whip up a reader’s enthusiasm for Sentence (b) through the earlier cosmic blarney involving the Leerlauf. An opponent might try to arouse a reader’s enthusiasm for Sentence (c) by alternative metaphors. No such considerations, though, could argue for preferring one perception, $p_b$, or $p_c$, over the other. One either has the perception, or one doesn’t. I myself much prefer Sentence (b) and do not experience perception $p_c$, but I can hardly command a person who already experiences $p_c$ not to do so. Anyone who might experience both perceptions, at different phenomenological times and places in the listening process, would find the polemic useful for focusing and refining the P-R-LISTS involved.

Another example will help us distinguish the logic of sentences in L from the logic of perceptions in our model. Suppose any common theory of tonal harmony as a component of a language L. Consider two sentences within that language. Sentence XDY reads, “Event X functions harmonically as a dominant of Event Y,” and sentence YDX reads, “Event Y functions harmonically as a dominant of Event X.” Clearly each sentence is well formed. And, just as clearly, the sentence that is the logical conjunction of XDY with YDX must be false. If XDY is true under a certain allowable substitution for X and Y, then YDX must be false under that substitution, and vice versa. We are assured of this without even considering any musical score, let alone doing any listening. Now let us turn our attention to Example 4.10, which sketches a cadence by Siegmund just before the last passage sung by Sieglinde in Act I of Die Walküre.

**Example 4.10**

(Staff notation and text corresponding to the musical passage described in the text.)
It seems at first that we have at hand here a perception-structure that involves exactly the sentence just branded as false, that is, the logical conjunction of XDY with YDX. For the X event is evidently perceived to resolve as a dominant seventh into the Y event at the moment of the cadence. (The textual alliteration on the vocal Gs amplifies the effect.) And, apparently at the same time and in the same place, we perceive the Y event as a dominant to the X event that immediately precedes it. (The harmony at Y eventually returns, at the end of Sieglinde’s passage, to another cadential gesture in G quite like the one that contains the X event.) It seems that we must deny the one perception or the other, in order to avoid a logical paradox.

But our difficulty is only apparent. The confusion arises from our having improperly reified one percept (as opposed to sentence) called XDY and one percept called YDX; the confusion is compounded by the fashion of speaking that makes us believe we have both perceptions “at the same time,” so that we try to imagine one composite perception called “the perception of both-XDY-and-YDX.” Our model enables us to avoid just these confusions, by articulating a variety of perceptions, at a variety of places in phenomenological space and time. The earlier analysis of an abstract deceptive cadence (Example 4.1) will serve us in good stead here. In connection with Example 4.10, we can formulate the perceptions $q_1$ through $q_6$ following, among others.

$q_1 = (\text{Event X},$  
Example 4.10 up the pause,  
$\ldots (q_2, \text{implication}) \ldots,$  
V-of-an-expected-I)$

$q_2 = (\text{Event X},$  
Example 4.10 ending with G instead of e$^{#6},$  
$\ldots (q_3, \text{realization}) \ldots,$  
cadential dominant)$

$q_3 = (\text{Event X},$  
Example 4.10 without the bass and figure for the event at the end,  
$\ldots (q_5, \text{confirmation}) \ldots,$  
cadential dominant)$

$q_4 = (\text{Event Y},$  
Events X and Y,  
$\ldots (q_5, \text{implication}) \ldots,$  
dominant of X)$

$q_5 = (\text{Event Y},$  
Events X and Y plus a protensive X’ that projects D$^7$ harmony,  
$\ldots (q_4, \text{realization}) \ldots,$  
dominant in transit from X to X’)$

$q_6 = (\text{Event Y},$  
Example 4.10 and on through Sieglinde’s passage,  
$\ldots (q_5, \text{confirmation and elaboration}) \ldots,$  
structural dominant in transit from Siegmund’s cadential G:V to Sieglinde’s)
All these percepts are well formed. Perception $q_7$ following is not well formed:

$$q_7 = (\text{Event X-and-Y},$$

$$\text{Example 4.10},$$

$$\ldots,$$

$$\ldots, \text{XYD, YDX}, \ldots).$$

The STatement-LIST for $q_7$ is malformed within the language $L$, so $q_7$ is malformed as a perception. There cannot be any phenomenological place and time where $q_7$ “is.” In contrast to that, one observes how Siegmund’s protensive $G^5$ event, involved implicitly in $q_1$, $q_2$, and $q_3$ as that-of-which-$X$-is-the-dominant, is a different phenomenological object from Sieglinde’s $Y$ event, an $E$ raised-sixth, involved in $q_4$, $q_5$, and $q_6$ as that-which-is-a-dominant-of-retained-$X$.

One more example will focus our attention even more sharply on the discongruity between the logic of sentences-in-the-language-$L$ and the logic of perceptions in our model. A well-known drawing outlines a Gestalt that can be seen as either a rabbit or a duck. In this connection we can construct a visual percept $r$, perception-of-rabbit, and a visual percept $d$, perception-of-duck; evidently both $r$ and $d$ are well formed and relevant. One can make verifiable statements on a STatement-LIST for $r$: these are ears; here is the eye; and so on. One can make verifiable statements in the same language about $d$: this is the bill; here is the eye; and so on. Present-day computer programs (at least in theory) could recognize such features of the drawing, find them well formed, and tell us both “Here is a rabbit” and “Here is a duck” according to stipulated $L$-criteria for uttering those remarks. However, although “I see a rabbit” and “I see a duck” are both valid perception-utterances, “I see a-rabbit-and-a-duck” is not; at least to my knowledge nobody ever sees both animals at the same time (in the same phenomenological place). We would not want our computer to tell us “Here is a both-rabbit-and-duck.” We would want the machine to know there is no such animal as a both-rabbit-and-duck.

Thus, even though “I perceive rabbit” and “I perceive duck” are both valid perceptions, we cannot infer the validity of “I perceive rabbit-and-duck.” We can infer “(I perceive rabbit) and (I perceive duck),” but only under a very special logical interpretation of the conjunctive “and”: the meaning of the conjunction here does not imply “at the same time in the same place.” That is, we must understand: “Somewhere I perceive rabbit and somewhere I perceive duck.” In this linguistic form, the operator “Somewhere I perceive” does not distribute over conjunction of its arguments: “((Somewhere I perceive)(thing 1)) and ((Somewhere I perceive)(thing 2))” does not mean the same as “(Somewhere I perceive)(((thing 1) and (thing 2))).” So, in particular, “((Somewhere I perceive)(rabbit)) and ((Somewhere I perceive)(duck))” is valid, while “(Somewhere I perceive)(rabbit and duck)” is not only invalid—since I don’t—but also malformed, since rabbit-and-duck is not a well-formed object within animal language.

In just the same way, “((Somewhere I perceive)(XYD) and ((Somewhere I perceive)(YDX))” is loosely speaking valid, if we mean by $Y$ here “something I infer from the acoustic signal during the indicated clock-time.” But “((Somewhere I per-
ceive)(XYD-and-YDX)” is not valid: there is no such thing as XYD-and-YDX in the language of harmonic theory.

And in just the same way, “((Somewhere I perceive) (a 5 URLinie)) and ((Somewhere I perceive) (a 3 URLinie))” is not malformed, though I do not myself assert it of the Handel composition; however, “((Somewhere I perceive) (both-a-5-URLinie-and-a-3-URLinie))” is malformed, since there is no such thing as both-a-5-URLinie-and-a-3-URLinie in the language of Schenkerian theory. If we wanted to, we could develop a post-Schenkerian theory in which a piece could logically have more than one “URLinie.” Using that new theory as a component within a new language L, we could then render the conjunctive perception well formed. Presumably we would change the vocabulary of our neo-theory and our SStatements, since “Ur” no longer seems appropriate.

We should certainly be willing to alter our theoretical discourse in this way, whenever a certain mass of perceptual experience leads us to believe that the alterations might enable us to articulate valuable analytic insights. But we should think long and hard before subjecting a received theoretical discourse to fundamental modification. In changing the language, we risk losing our ability to express some of the features that characterize what is problematic about a tricky perceptual situation. For instance, we could create a new word “dubbit,” defined as the Gestaltist drawing recently discussed; by changing my language in this way I could say “I see a dubbit” and thereby “solve the problems” involved in saying both “I see a rabbit” and “I see a duck.” But it is just the “problems” in the perceptual situation that we find characteristic and interesting, worthy of extended analysis; our linguistic expedient has turned the interesting phenomenon into a humdrum affair. So you see a dubbit. Who cares if you see a dubbit?

We should generally take the same methodological tack when some of our perceptions about a piece of music involve SStatements that are logically incompatible-in-L with other SStatements that we articulate in connection with other perceptions. In such a situation, we should generally want our analysis to convey the characteristic multiplicity of the perceptions involved and the characteristic incompatibility of their assertion in-the-same-place at-the-same-time. The rhythm of the dialectic thus engaged will be a significant aspect of our rhythmic response to the music.

Indeed, one of the most interesting features of our model is the way in which it implicitly engages our sense of musical rhythm beyond what is notated. The model suggests, for example, that the rhythmic effect of the passage from Morgen-gruß involves not just aspects of the music traditionally considered as “rhythmic,” but also the way in which the various percepts P1, P2, P3, and so on come into mental focus, engage one another in various P-R situations, recede from focus, and leave behind various mental residues, all the while the acoustic signal is proceeding in clock-time. The model is at present not worked out adequately in this direction. It lacks precision compared to traditional models for musical rhythm in the West since the Renaissance. To provide anything like such precision and for other reasons as well, it needs to have worked into it more explicit roles for the various sorts of time, some of them multidimensional, within which the perceptions
p, are formed, interrelate, and possibly decay in memory. These sorts of time might well include a clock time for the acoustic signal, another Euclidean time within which the listeners' organs react as systems in the sense of classical physics, a phenomenological time whose passage is marked by events that are pertinent changes of state within those organs (e.g., neuron firings or patterns of such firings) a theoretically determined phenomenological time marked by mental constructs called “beats” or “measures” or “breves” or “perfections” or something of the sort (within certain pieces that posit such mensural notions), a processing time in our model within which something metaphorically like EVALuation of p-structures takes place, possibly a time in which our higher-level parser manipulates configurations of p-structures before EVALuation, and possibly a time within which EVALuation is subject to external interrupts carried into the processing system from one or more of the other time-systems just listed.

The project, when sketched this way, may strike the reader as hopelessly extensive. In fact, it strikes me that way. I think that our model, no matter how much development it may undergo, will always remain incomplete and informal in some of its most compelling rhythmic aspects. That is surely a defect in the model regarded as a component within a potential formal theory of music-perception. But it does not damage the model irreparably as a linguistic tool for making analytic statements about preexisting pieces of music. In the discussion of Morgengruss, I hope to have exemplified some ways in which I feel the model can in fact convey new and characteristic ideas about aspects of a piece that are undeniably “rhythmic.” I used English prose and a few graphics for the purpose. I can imagine using other media as well: poetry, other languages, other kinds of graphic art, theater arts, musical performance of the piece, or of excerpts therefrom, or of a series of examples (with or without commentary), composed Lehrstücke of various sorts, and so on, the various media alone or in combination. The graphic conventions of Schenkerian or post-Schenkerian theories, for example, might enable one to represent aspects of p-structures in local ConteXTs by “windows” framing regions of incomplete or tentative graphs. Example 4.8.1 through 4.8.9 suggests such formats. A considerable amount of rhythmic theory could be formalized from the visually manifest interrelationships of such windows-on-graphs. The Euclidean ground underlying such formalization, which is the plane of the page or of the computer monitor, would have to be taken into careful consideration, lest its influence on the theory be underestimated.34

Earlier, I suggested that the p-model is helpful for distinguishing between the undefined “importance” of perceptions, and the syntactic priority of elements within a language L that admits such priorities, elements like subjects of sentences,

34. The tree-structures of Lerdahl and Jackendoff. A Generative Theory, seem particularly amenable to elaboration through such “windows.” Extending their theory in this way might entail modifying their methodology, particularly on matters of linguistic “preference” and perceptual priority. As the reader will have gathered from my earlier remarks on this issue, I believe that modification in this regard would in fact enrich their theory, which in general I find engaging, powerful, and significant. Recent lectures by Lerdahl, along with private communications, lead me to believe that the theory may develop in the direction of something like my “windows,” although of course on its own terms, not on mine.
tonic harmonies, strong beats, or Kopftöne of Urlinien. The model can also distinguish other sorts of priorities that are helpful in avoiding fruitless political/legal controversy. For example, we can define a category called “finality”: \( p_1 \) is more final than \( p_2 \) if the ConteXT of \( p_1 \) includes that of \( p_2 \) in all respects and also extends beyond it in the clock time of the piece. We can also define “P-R-emblematicity”: \( p_1 \) is more P-R-emblematic than \( p_2 \) if the P-R list of \( p_1 \) is longer, or deeper, or more-inclusive in some other defined way, than the P-R-LIST of \( p_2 \). We can define “ST-emblematicity” in the same spirit. And so forth. We are free to assign aesthetic values to these categories if we wish: one critic can legitimately believe and claim that more-final perceptions are thereby “more important” (of greater aesthetic value) than less-final perceptions; another critic can as legitimately believe and claim that the more emblematic perceptions are the “more important” ones; and so on.

I argue that discriminations of this sort are methodologically desirable, not because I believe that value judgments are unimportant in the critical context but—on the contrary—precisely because I believe they are so very important. We ought to be correspondingly clear about what those values are, to ourselves and—to others. That is why we should not mistakenly confuse our values with formal properties of rationalist systems. The confusion can only impoverish and mar both our systematics and our valuations. To put the matter more colloquially: whatever the individual critics of the preceding paragraph believe, they will all know what they are talking about.

Part V: Perception and the Productive Modes of Behavior

At the very beginning of this chapter, I said that I found the trend toward phenomenological studies of music problematic for music theory, particularly in what one might call the sociology of the matter. I shall now pursue that thought.

The problems I want to consider arise from a tradition in studies of perception, to suppose that there is something X that perceives and something Y that is perceived. Typically X is a hypothetical person; sometimes X is a mind that might be God or a computer or an animal.\(^\text{35}\) Typically, Y is asserted, explicitly or implicitly, to have a predicate that can be called “reality” or “existence” or “being,” or something of the sort. Even Berkeley agrees that a tree Y does always “exist,” since God (\( = X \)) is always observing it.\(^\text{36}\)

Classical European philosophy and Indo-European sentence structure suggest to us that we call X a “subject” and Y an “object,” mentally supplying a verb that describes a relationship in which X is doing something to Y-that-is-not-X; X is “observing” Y or “perceiving” Y, or something of that sort.

\(^{35}\) Or a plant? I once saw a fast-action film of a vine that reversed its direction of growth along the ground 180 degrees, and crawled back for some distance in that direction to reach a stake that had been put in the ground there; the vine then proceeded to climb the stake. Did the vine perceive the stake? If not, why not?

\(^{36}\) See Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 647 and following, for an entertaining discussion of Berkeley’s argument.
Husserl proceeds quite differently in these matters, as do other modern philosophers among his precursors, contemporaries, and followers. But they still recognize a distinction of X and Y in some form. Y is crucially not X-itself but rather some thing(s) demonstrably “other”—this tree here now (that is not me), this acoustic signal here as I listen to it over this time span, that is impinging upon me (but is not me), this artwork as I perceive it or understand it, perhaps as Z made it, or even as Z is making it, but not (NB) as-it-is-emerging-now-from-me, let alone as-it-is-being-me-and-I-am-being-it.

The habit of distinguishing X from Y in thinking about perception does not in itself pose a danger for music theory; the habit becomes dangerous, though, when we add an assumption that music theories are, or should be, fundamentally perceptual in nature or purpose. That assumption makes us take as a point of departure for music theory (and not just for studies in musical perception) a paradigm in which a “listener” X is “perceiving” some “music” Y that is demonstrably other-than-X. In such imaginings, “the music” Y is profoundly and fundamentally there, as made by some Z, prior to any activity of X-now, even prior to X-now’s presence. For X, Y has Gegebenheit and Dasein, not just Sinn and Anwesenheit. Roughly speaking, X finds Y given and there, not just sensible and present. That is so even if, in some situations, Z might be X-yesterday or X-thirty-seconds ago.

The X/Y paradigm can accommodate without undue strain the apparatus of Husserl’s phenomenology. But it fits very poorly with the present-tense activities of composers and performers. “The music” that a composer is composing right now is not something demonstrably other than the composer; on the contrary, we say precisely that it is something “of the composer.” Nor is the music-as-it-is-

37. Miller, Husserl, 7–32.
38. I phrase aspects of the sentence to recall Hegel, for it might appear at first that Hegel’s phenomenology does precisely obliterate, or attempt to obliterate, the X/Y distinction. In a sense that is true. But the picture it gives of Hegel’s procedure is not complete enough. The Phenomenology of Mind does not deny subject-perceiving-object and substitute Understanding-understanding-Understanding. Rather, the book portrays a process of enlightenment, a journey that begins at subject-perceiving-object and ends at Understanding-understanding-Understanding. The journey is a very different thing from the destination: a trip from Des Moines to Chicago to New York to Paris to Damascus is not the same thing as Damascus, nor does it deny Des Moines. Damascus is not a substitute for Des Moines in this connection. For “Des Moines” read “Consciousness” or “Perception”; for “Damascus” read “Self-consciousness” or “Understanding.” The air carriers and intermediate airports are the dialectic process and the stages of dialectic transition. According to Gadamer, Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind demonstrates “the necessary transition [emphasis mine] from consciousness to self-consciousness. . . . R. Wiehl. . . . has shown that in looking back from the chapter on ‘Force and Understanding,’ one must view ‘Sense Certainty’ as the point of departure: namely, . . . consciousness as yet entirely unconscious of its essential self-consciousness [X thinking ‘I perceive Y’ and taking it for granted that Y is something not-me] . . . Hegel’s claim that the dialectical transitions are necessary [emphasis mine] is made good . . . again and again if one reads carefully,” Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic, trans. P. C. Smith (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976), 36.
39. Chapter 1 of Miller, Husserl, also addresses this issue. The differentiability of Y from X is clear in Husserl’s insisting that “the ‘direct’ objects of our perceptual acts are ordinary physical objects, and not anything else in their stead” (14). Miller continues by citing Husserl’s own text: “I perceive the thing, the object of nature, the tree there [emphasis mine] in the garden; that and nothing else is the real object of the perceiving ‘intention.’ . . . an ‘inner image’ of the real tree that stands out there [emphasis mine] before me [emphasis mine] is nowise given.”
being-composed fundamentally there prior to the activity of the-composer-now; on the contrary, the gestus of composition involves producing something not there prior to that activity. This is as true for the symphonetes, the collage composer, and the composer of 4’ 33”, as it is for the phonascus, the original genius, and the composer of The Ring. To be sure, a traditional composer at work can enter into noetic/noematic exchanges, even into subject/object relationships, with sketches or portions of the piece already drafted. Perceptually oriented music theories will then be pertinent to the working procedure, perhaps even useful or indispensable. But the music-as-it-is-being-composed is far from prior to the composer’s activity, nor is it something “out there,” other than the composer.

Once the music has been composed, it becomes a wholly different phenomenon for the composer. It becomes a trace or a record of past activities. The record has special values and meanings for performers, listeners, and critics, but for the composer as composer-of-the-piece, the trace means precisely what the sight of ski tracks on the hill behind means to a downhill skier who has navigated a treacherous slope, or what a photograph of yourself on the Eiffel Tower means to you if you have just returned from your first trip to Paris. Not just the level of meaning but the kind of meaning is the same in all three cases: “That was me. I was there.”

In contrast, the composer-composing might say, “Here I-cum-it am-cum-is.” And the listener-perceiving would characteristically say yet something else: “I am here-now with that music there-now.” The listener-perceiving is involved in the X/Y paradigm; the composer-composing is not, nor is the composer-having-composed. The composer as composer does not “perceive” the art work (or “understand” it either, in Hegel’s sense); the composer either is doing it or has done it. Roger Sessions puts this well:

Composition is a deed, an action. . . . The climber in the high mountains is intent upon the steps he is taking, on the practical realization of those steps. . . . [The composer’s] psychology is not dissimilar. . . . extremely often the completed work is incomprehensible to him immediately after it is finished. Why? Because his experience in creating the work is incalculably more intense than any later experience he can have from it; because the finished product is, so to speak, the goal of that experience and not in any sense a repetition of it. He cannot relive the compositional experience. . . . And yet he is too close to it to detach himself to the extent necessary to see his work objectively, and to allow it to exert its inherent power over him.  

The X/Y paradigm fits poorly in the same ways with the performer in the act of performing. “The music” that this person is playing now is not “over there” for the player; it is not something other-than-me, prior to any activity on my part. As


I have modified the sense of the passage by one of my omissions. Sessions writes: “He cannot relive the compositional experience without effort which seems quite irrelevant.” I do not see how the experience can be relived at all.
with composing, the gestus of performing involves producing something that is not “there” prior to the activity, something “of the artist” at the time of creation. To be sure, a traditional performer at work can enter into noetic/noematic exchanges, even subject/object relationships, with parts of the acoustic signal already produced; to that extent perceptually oriented music theories are relevant and useful. But “the music” as what-is-being-played-right-now is far from prior to the performer’s activity. Here, even more than in the case of composition, no one can help but recognize “the music,” after it becomes separate from the person of the musician, as a trace or record of that person’s activities. We commonly use the word “record” in precisely that connection.

There is not space here to explore the ways in which theories of music may be useful to working composers and performers, or to debate the extent to which useful theories in those connections may or may not be those explicitly bound to ways of perceiving preexisting compositions and performances (rather than those bound to general abstract contexts of science, logic, dialectics, et al.). Personally, I believe that music theories of all kinds can be useful beyond analysis and perception as goads to musical action, ways of suggesting what might be done, beyond ways of regarding what has been done. But I shall leave these issues unexamined any farther, and proceed instead to sum up my polemic point: since “music” is something you do, and not just something you perceive (or understand), a theory of music can not be developed fully from a theory of musical perception (with or without an ancillary dialectic). At least, so I maintain. 41

Actually, I am not very sure what a “theory of music” might be, or even a “theory of modern Western art-music,” but so far as I can imagine one (of either) that includes a theory of musical perception, I imagine it including the broader study of what we call people’s “musical behavior,” a category that includes competent listening to be sure, but also competent production and performance. Here I understand production and performance not only in the sense of high art but also as manifest in everyday acts of musical “noodling,” and in a whole spectrum of intermediate activities. Under the rubric of noodling I include rhythmic gestures, conscious or unconscious, like patterns of walking, finger-drumming, or nervous scratching; I also include singing, whistling, or humming bits of familiar or invented tunes, or variations on familiar tunes; I also include timbral productions like twanging metal objects, knocking on wooden ones, making vocal or other bodily sounds without pitched fundamentals or direct phonemic significance, blowing on conch-shells, through hose-pipes, through blades of grass, and so on. The range

41. I differ explicitly here with the stance of Lerdahl and Jackendoff. The first sentence of their book reads: “We take the goal of a theory of music to be a formal description of the musical intuitions of a listener who is experienced in a musical idiom” (A Generative Theory, 1). I am impressed but not persuaded by their arguments on the issues I have just brought up, arguments that can be found explicitly on pages 7–8 of their text and implicitly throughout it.

It is true that the musical intuition of their listener is not “out there” or “other than me” for that person. But the musical intuition is not “the music”; it is not Husserl’s demonstrable-this, like the “real tree” of note 39. When I listen to Morgengruß, “the music” is (that instance of) Morgengruß. That is what I am listening to (perceiving); my intuitions, like my ears and my brain, are things I am listening with or through. For me the song is given and there.
of activities between noodling and high art would include bad-and-incompetent performances of art, bad-but-somewhat-competent ones (where the performer realizes that a goal has not been attained and has some sense—cognitive or kinetic—of what to do about it), playing in a band or orchestra, or singing in a chorus, at various levels of competence, dancing in more or less structured ways, performing Lieder or Gospel or chamber music or jazz or rock, informally, semi-formally, or formally, writing passages or pieces of music for informal, semi-formal, or formal groups to play, or for high school bands, orchestras, choruses, or “shows,” improvising solo or in ensemble, putting an ensemble musical score up on the piano rack and “fooling around” with it (making impromptu transcriptions first this way, then that), trying to recover the sound of an ensemble piece from memory by such “fooling around,” on piano or synthesizer keyboards, and so on.

The p-model we have been studying does not begin to engage these forms of musical behavior, and it will not do so until we can conceptualize the various activities as formal “utterances” of some kind, in extended “languages L” of some kind. I hinted at such possibilities when I first discussed the “language L” of the p-model, in Part II of this chapter. I shall suggest the possibilities recurrently throughout the material of Part V that follows. I am not sure that “language” is a useful word to retain in this connection, although there are precedents for the usage (e.g., body language, the Language of Love). And even if the p-model “begins to engage” the activities, it will not very likely to able to model them.

The activities as listed here bring into focus what I earlier called the sociology of the matter at hand. Anyone who has spent a certain amount of time around contemporary U.S. music departments or conservatories will be aware of many ways in which our institutions—academic and nonacademic—separate competence in creating fresh music, in performing existing music, and in understanding received musical art. We will recognize this separation whether we like it, dislike it, or respond to it with mixed feelings. The reader has gathered that I dislike it. I do admit that it has some conveniences, mainly in that it discourages dilettantism. Its disadvantages, much more serious to my way of thinking, lie in its encouraging young composers, performers, and scholars to concentrate respectively upon producing “effective” sounds, upon exercising mechanical skills, and upon viewing art as something “given” and “there.” We should encourage these young people instead to conceive their various activities as interrelated, and in all cases as ways of making poetic statements. I shall say a good deal more on the latter subject further on.

Speaking in particular as a professional music theorist, I worry a lot about the many examinations I have attended and given, in which students are certified as competent musical “perceivers” primarily on the basis of the way in which they run critical analyses of given art works, using received languages L that are not music. Sometimes a student becomes paralyzed if I go to the piano, play something, and ask: “Do you mean, like this?” Or the student will freeze on being asked to clarify or defend an analytic reading by “fooling around” of this sort at the keyboard. I have often had the feeling that I would encounter such blockage if I did try to initiate such discourse with an examinee. Remarkably, there seems to be no correla-
tion either way, between the keyboard ability of examinees and their susceptibility to this paralysis.42

I am not concerned here about advanced students of music theory proper, who are being examined in their specific proficiency at this or that technique of analysis, or in their acquaintance with the professional or critical literature. I am concerned, rather, with student musicians in general: they are being encouraged by our educational system to dissociate the understanding of music from its production and performance, to associate musical “understanding” with an ability to give approved responses in English, and/or in certain symbolic languages, to art works that are “given” and “there,” art works whose species are well agreed-on in advance of any examination. When we certify “understanding music” on this basis, we are behaving like the authorities who certify “understanding French” on the basis of questions asked in English, to be answered in English, about preexisting French texts. (I suppose that one can technically check off (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) “in French” as well as “in English.”) If, on encountering a student certified as “competent in French” on that basis, one says, “Bien. Causons musique,” or, “Il me faut sortir. Écrivez-moi alors deux mots,” the result may be substantial or total paralysis. The student may then protest: “I don’t speak or write French, but I do have a reading knowledge.” And the student will be justly indignant since we, the authorities ourselves, have propagated the myth that such a monster as “a reading knowledge of French” exists—that it is possible to read French intelligently without speaking or writing it, and that the ability to answer in English questions in English (or baby “French”) about preexisting French texts constitutes knowledge of French in some way, rather than knowledge about French.

Our conceiving (and encountering) “readers” of French who neither speak nor write French is just like our conceiving (and encountering) “listeners” to music who do not make music in any way. Indeed, we conceive (and encounter) “fans” who watch but do not play ball games, and “audiences” for political debates who do not themselves engage in any political activity but, rather, watch “the politicians,” listen to “them,” and eventually—perhaps—vote. In other times and places, a region was considered “musical” if its inhabitants habitually made music, one way or another, to the best of their various abilities; nowadays and here, regional music “lovers” boast of their “world-class” orchestras (whose members probably commute), their concert series of prestigious recitalists, their improved attendance at concerts (especially expensive fund-raising concerts), their superb hi-fis, their state-of-the-art compact disc players, and so on.

42. In an upper-division analysis course I once taught, there was a student who could play the first piano sonata of Boulez very well. In the course we had been discussing a piano piece by Debussy for two weeks when she came up with an analytic reading that I could not hear at all. I said, “I can’t hear what you mean—play it and give me an idea,” whereupon she replied, “I don’t play the piece.” “Well,” said I, “I don’t mean as you would on a recital; I mean as you did when you heard (such-and-such).” “Oh,” she replied, “I haven’t played the piece at all; I thought this was a course in analysis.” This student was more than competent at the piano but still paralyzed. Some students in this sort of situation play atrociously but give it their best try. On the other hand, some students who can play well also give it their best, while some who play badly freeze up (and of course blame that on a lack of keyboard ability).
And our academies are right at hand, to help the “lovers” decide what to enjoy, in their erotic-acquisitive orgies of consumption. ("Pachelbel’s Canon in D can be yours for only one dollar!” touts a recent advertisement. Poor Pachelbel—he thought it was his. La donn’ è mobile . . . ) Just like the “ability to read” French, the “enjoyment” of music, along with its “appreciation” and to a significant degree even its “understanding,” are all part of a great social swell, a movement which threatens to turn us all into critical consumers, rather than enthusiastic practitioners, of human activity. The movement is wrong. The Lord, after all, did not tell Adam and Eve to observe, understand, and appreciate the world; He told them to replenish it.

Naturally, one cannot simple-mindedly divorce constructive creation from perceptive understanding, as if the one could occur without the other, or at least without some experience of the other. I have no wish (obviously) to dispute the value of studies in perception, nor do I much disagree with the claim of Lerdahl and Jackendoff, that “Composers and performers must be active listeners as well.”43 I would, however, qualify it so as to read, “Composers and performers will normally have done a great deal of expert and active listening, before attaining a state of concentrated readiness in which any specific new creative act can transpire.” Schoenberg puts the essence of my revision as compactly as one could imagine it: “Theory must never precede creation: ‘And the Lord saw that all was well done.’”44

Schoenberg is speaking of “theory” here in the sense of “structural evaluation,” so the stress in his context falls on the word “well”: theoretical evaluation follows creation. In the context of my present polemic, I would stress the word “saw” as much or more: first the Lord created, and only then did the Lord perceive what He had (already) done. In the same context, Schoenberg’s metaphor suggests a powerful elaboration: when the Lord is pleased by what He sees, He responds to His perception by creating something more, or something new. Thus:

And God said, Let the waters . . . be gathered . . . and let the dry land appear: and it was so.
. . . and God saw that it was good.
And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass . . . and the fruit tree . . .
and it was so.

Genesis, 9–11

Here one could say that the Lord uses past perception as a stimulus to fresh creation, but it is equally important to put it that He uses fresh creation as a mode of response to his latest perception. Creation is thus a species of perception-statement: “LOOKS LIKE it could use some grass and trees.” (And it was so.) Many composers will find this creative/perceptive rhythm familiar: one recognizes that a certain part of the composition is the way it ought to be when—and sometimes only when—another part of the composition begins to take shape as a consequence.

43. Lerdahl and Jackendoff, A Generative Theory, 7.
44. Arnold Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony (New York: W. W. Norton, 1954), 194. The quotation is from the essay “Apollonian Evaluation of a Dionysian Epoch.”
Making fresh music as a mode of musical perception—this link in the chain of perception-and-creation is missing in the perceptual theories we have so far considered, including my own p-model so far as it has been worked out as yet. Perhaps the link can eventually be forged within the context of received conceptual systems. After all, Husserl calls perception a mental act, and describes it as something extraordinarily creative. I do not see as yet, though, how he might distinguish and relate what we call acts of listening, acts of performing, and acts of composing, as varieties of perceptual response in various musical contexts.\(^{45}\)

The link might be supplied by something like the literary theory of Harold Bloom, who asserts that “the meaning of a poem can only be a poem, but another poem, a poem not itself.”\(^{46}\) The idea as it stands does not transfer easily to music, but that is largely because of problems attaching themselves to the word “meaning” in Bloom’s text. Suppose we modify the notion and, now using the word “poem” to mean any crafted artwork, claim that “a poem can only be perceived in the making of another poem, a poem not itself.”

In that case, when we play excitedly at the piano on returning home after a stimulating concert we are not executing an aid to perception, or to the memory of perception; rather, we are in the very act of perceiving, the other poem being our impromptu performance. The same is true when we play fascinatedly again and again over the opening of the finale to the \textit{Appassionata}; we are not matching the fingers and positions of our right hands to a preconceived “perception” of the theme; rather, we are in the act of perceiving the theme as we move the parts of our bodies to play it; the performances that we essay, if sufficiently competent in gesture, embody a process that is our act of perception. And Beethoven’s act of making his c minor Piano Concerto was inter alia his perception, at that time, of Mozart’s c minor Concerto. The score, his concomitant utterance, was accordingly a species of perception-Statement. (His act was and is—in retention—many other things, too; the act was/is not one object at one place at one time in phenomenological space-time.) Certain attested remarks made by Beethoven about Mozart’s piece do not interest us so much, as records of his various perceptions. Our interest is not less because the remarks are verbal, but because they are inferior to Beethoven’s concerto as “other poems.”

That feature of Beethoven’s verbal remarks highlights an important difference of the post-Bloomian view from the Bloomian one. The post-Bloomian view does not exclude critical utterances as poetry. No more does it exclude acts of analysis. The making of an analysis can be an act of perception, in this view, to the extent—and only to the extent—that the analytic report which traces the deed of perception is itself “another poem.”

The broad interpretation of “poem” allows us to admit traditional varieties of interpretative studies into the canon of critical perception, thereby weakening the


force of Bloom’s original assertion while expanding its domain. The broad interpretation specifically admits under the post-Bloomian rubric not only the score of Beethoven’s c minor Concerto, and not only my playing the theme from the finale of the Appassionata this way and that, but also analyses like those of Lerdahl and Jackendoff, or like my discourse involving the syntax of Macbeth’s sentence. In doing so, the critical approach brings sharply to our attention the need for studies in the poetics of analysis. To the degree that analytic records of musical perceptions are poems, ski tracks tracing the poetic deeds that were the perceptions themselves, then critics—if not analysts—must concern themselves with the poetic resources at hand, that is, the sorts of poetic spaces analysts inhabit and the varieties of poetic media through which they move in executing their deeds.

I take this search for poetics to be the core of the critical position projected by James Randall, Elaine Barkin, and Benjamin Boretz in recent years; their writings “about” music merge seamlessly at various moments with critical theory, analysis, more-or-less-traditional “poetry,” and verbal musical composition that has close connections with the more explicitly “compositional” activities of Kenneth Gaburo and Robert Ashley, among others. Also concerned with poetics, and closer to Bloom’s original sense of “other poems,” are the Functional Analysis of Hans Keller, whose ideas considerably antedate Bloom’s, and David Antin’s “talk poem” called ‘the death of the hired man,’ performed at the Baxter Art Gallery at Cal Tech in 1982 on the occasion of Siah Armajani’s construction of a poetry lounge (a version of a New England schoolroom, with handcrafted wooden benches and desks, whose tops have lines from Robert Frost’s ‘Mending Wall’ stenciled across them).”


48. Except for the works of Ashley, the recent writings and the compositions are represented by contributions to Perspectives of New Music, starting with the Spring/Summer 1972 issue, which contains James Randall’s “Compose Yourself: A Manual for the Young,” Perspectives of New Music 10.2 (1972), 1–12. Among other things, the article projects an attempt to build a very new sort of perceptual ConteXT in which to hear Alberich’s opening passage within Götterdämmerung, Act II, Scene 1. Barkin is represented by a number of substantial pieces in the subsequent issues of PNM. Of special interest in the present connection is “’play it AS it lays,’” which records a perception of Arnold Schoenberg’s piano piece, Opus 19, Number VI (vol. 17, no. 2, Spring/Summer 1979, pp. 17–24). The enormous labors of love through which Benjamin Boretz influenced the journal over many years are only hinted at in his modest editorial apologia, “Afterward (: A Foreword)” (vol. 22, Fall/Winter 1983 and Spring/Summer 1984, pp. 557–559). Kenneth Gaburo is celebrated by a large number of contributions to vol. 18 (Fall/Winter 1979 and Spring/Summer 1980, 7–256). The contribution by Gaburo himself is a lecture/composition/performance/talk poem (“Brain: . . . Half A Whole,” pp. 215–256). The reader may want to approach it, or to review it, after perusing the discussion of David Antin and Marjorie Perloff later in this article. Pieces by and about Robert Ashley appear in Formations, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1985), 14–63. Musicians may not be familiar with this journal; it is published in Madison by the University of Wisconsin Press.

49. FA No. 1: Mozart, K. 421. The Score 22 (1958), 56–64.

To characterize the cited writings as *Versuche* toward the poetics of analysis is not to succumb to a superficial impression about their “poetic” manner in the vulgar sense. A casual reader of Randall, Barkin, and Boretz might easily be misled by such an impression, particularly considering the positions they occupy in a dialectic that is at once intellectual, cultural, and historical, a dialectic that involves them along with the writings of Milton Babbitt and the history of PNM. In a superficial view of those relationships, Babbitt is “scientific” and “objective,” while the next generation is “poetic” and “subjective.” The superficial view is not exactly wrong, but it is very far from adequate to engage the critical issues at hand, issues which it hopelessly trivializes. The writings of Babbitt are as much poems, in the broad interpretation of the post-Bloomian view, as are the writings of Randall. In that view, the issue is not *whether* there shall be poems, but rather what *sorts* of poems there shall be, and by what criteria they are to be valued.

Marjorie Perloff focuses the issues very clearly. At the opening of her essay, “Postmodernism and the Impasse of Lyric,” she quotes some traditional lamentation by Christopher Clausen, who has these things to say, among others:

> Few doubt that the rise of science has had something to do with displacing [poetry] as a publically important vehicle for those truths that people accept as being centrally important. The attempt to persuade the reading public that figurative, ironic, or connotative modes of thought and discourse retain their value in an age of computer language has not been notably successful. . . . [educated Americans today] undoubtedly believe that anything of real importance can be better said in prose.

Perloff examines brilliantly “the assumptions behind this statement, . . . not untypical of discussions of poetry in our leading journals.” The assumptions are: “First, that ‘poetry’ and ‘science’ have mutually exclusive modes of discourse. Second, that ‘poetry’ is the opposite of ‘prose.’ Third, that poetry once served and should serve as a vehicle for ‘truth.’ . . . And, fourth, that poetry is inherently ‘figurative, ironic, or connotative’ and, as such, stands opposed to ‘computer language,’ which is presumably non-figurative, straightforward, and denotative. . . . the implication is that the ‘truth’ of poetry is one of subjectivity, of personal feeling and experience.”

These observations launch a virtuoso exercise in critical scholarship, including perceptive analyses of poetry by Louis Zukofsky and Gertrude Stein, which culminates in the extended discussion of Antin’s talk poem on Frost. Toward the end of her critique, Perloff picks up her original theme:

> By this time, the audience has been brought round to consider, not only the connection between Frost’s “hired man” and Antin’s, but also between the status of Armajani, who was *hired* [emphasis mine D. L.] to design the poetry lounge, and Antin who was hired to speak in it. . . . Antin’s casual talk has been, all along, . . . a critique of Frost’s way of writing poetry with reference to Antin’s own poetic, his faith that poetry must be based on actual observation and natural language . . . the text puts forward that poetic not by any kind of general statement, but through a

series of narratives, images, and discursive patterns so that we are finally not quite sure what we have witnessed: prose discourse or poetry? Lecture or story? Philosophical argument or sleight-of-hand? . . . Antin does not regard “computer language” or “the rise of Science” as the enemy; . . . and although he regards “truths” as indeed of central importance, he is more interested in questions of appropriateness (what does it mean to do x [emphasis mine D. L.] in this context?) and inconsistencies [sc. rabbits and ducks D. L.] than in what Clausen calls “the truths of moments, situations, relationships.”

My post-Bloomian proposition, that the perception of a poetic work resides in the (active) making of another poetic work, a work that might be a “performance” in traditional terms, is not such an esoteric idea as the barrage of scholarship over the last few pages may have made it seem. To help convey the point, I will copy out a wonderful poem:

—Accori accori accori, uom, a la strada!
—Che ha’, fi’ de la putta?—I son rubato.
—Chi t’ha rubato?—Una, che par che rada come rasoi’, si m’ha netto lasciato.
—Or come non le davi de la spada?
—I dare’ anzi a me.—Or se’ ’mpazzato?
—Non so; che’l dâ?—Così mi par che vada:
or t’avess’ella cieco, sciagurato!
—E vedi che ne pare a que’ che’l sanno?
—Di’ quel, che tu mi rubi.—Or va’ con Dio!
—Ma ando pian, ch’i vo’ pianger lo danno.
—Che ti diparti?—Con animo rio.
—Tu abbi’l danno con tutto’l malanno!
—Or chi m’ha morto?—E che diavol sacc’io?
—Cecco Angiolieri (1250–1319)

In trying to “perceive” the poem so that it makes sense to you, are you not taken by an urge to perform it—to read it aloud and act the roles of the three characters, with appropriate vocal modifications? I am. So far as I kinetically sense the vigorous movements of the characters while they converse—which I do to a considerable degree as I am reading their parts—I am also trying to direct the scene for a theatrical production, as part of my mode of perception. This is not to say that I

53. The text is taken from G. R. Kay, ed., The Penguin Book of Italian Verse, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1958). Kay provides a “plain prose translation”: “Run, run, run, man, along that street!” “What’s wrong, whoreson?” “I’ve been robbed.” “Who robbed you?” “A woman, who shears like a razor, she’s left me so bare.” “Well, why didn’t you have at her with your sword?” “I’d sooner turn it on myself.” “Are you mad?” “I don’t know; what makes you think so?” “The way you are going on: it’s as good as if she had blinded you, you wretch!”
“See how it appears to people who understand?” “Let them know that you rob me.” “O go away!” “I’m going, but slowly, for I must weep my loss.” “How do you leave me?” “In bad heart.” “Well, you can suffer your ‘loss’ and every illness with it, for all I care!” “Who is killing me now?” “How the devil should I know?”
I would consider irrelevant to my perceptions closely reasoned studies of the syntactic structure, the historical contexts of thirteenth-century Italy (including the rise of the vernacular in literature and the development of the sonnet), the intrinsic sound-structure of the text, the rhythms in the changes of speakers, the ways in which those rhythms counterpoint the regularities of the sonnet “form,” contributing thereby to the fantastic modulation and theatrical coup when the woman herself appears on the scene (talking about perception), and so forth. All of these studies would help clarify, focus, organize, and intensify my perceptions. But they would not shift the essential modes of those perceptions. At least I do not think they would: I do not imagine myself “outgrowing” my urge to recite, act, and direct the three characters, once I acquire “sufficient” reflective knowledge about (or Hegelian understanding of) the play that contains them. I only imagine my performance becoming richer, denser, more compelling, more “true.” The reader who was interested in my earlier analysis of Macbeth’s soliloquy may have experienced such a response there: to the extent one begins by acting or directing Macbeth in response to the text, to that extent one continues perceiving the passage in the same mode; fresh analytic insight (e.g., about “This” or “multitudinous”) will not wean one away from a performance mode; it will only improve the performance, or at any rate stimulate more ambitious performances.

A skeptic could point out that I am discussing a play (by Shakespeare) and an unusually theatrical sonnet (by Cecco); it is only natural to respond to these works in a theatrical mode. Fair enough, and I do not want to promote a priori any one mode of perception as universally “better” than any other. Only I believe we are in some danger, these days, of ignoring the more productive modes of perception; I think we underestimate seriously the extent to which those modes are alive and active even in situations in which their pertinence is not so immediately apparent as it is with Shakespeare and Cecco, situations in which we think of ourselves as “readers,” not as speakers, writers, actors, and directors; as “listeners,” not as players and composers.54

To illustrate my point, I shall ask you to imagine the following scenario. You are a young warrior of ancient Rome, taking flight from an armed mass of pursuing enemies. Desperately seeking refuge, you burst unwittingly into the Temple of the Vestal Virgins, a shrine forbidden to males under penalty of death. Amazed and irate priestesses surround you. Collecting yourself as best you can, you turn to them and say—what?

Well you certainly do not say “Pardon ME!” presumably tipping your helmet to the ladies and looking about surreptitiously for a convenient exit. At least, you do not say that unless you are the person who composed the College Board Examination in Latin that I took some thirty-five years ago. Of course, the question on that person’s examination was not “What did the young man say to the Virgins?” but, rather, “What is the correct translation of ‘Ignoscite’ in the above passage?”

We were offered five translations from which to choose. When I read “Pardon me” as the first of the options, I broke out laughing in the examination hall, draw-

ing some indignant attention from the priests of that ritual. How nice, I thought, an examiner with a sense of humor. Then, as I read the other four “answers,” the awful truth dawned: “Pardon me” was in fact the “correct” answer. Indeed, according to the question posed, I was to support “Pardon ME!” not only as a plausible translation for “Ignoscite” in the context, but as a correct translation, and not only a correct translation but the correct translation.

The examiner, of course, had thought “PARdon me,” or more likely had not been thinking (perceiving) anything at all in the theatrical modes my scenario tries to suggest, the modes in which I had been taking in the story as best I could under the examination conditions, both by temperament and because I was myself a young man in a competitive situation being judged by older authorities. The examiner had certainly not stopped to consider all the connections of the expression “pardon me” in modern English usage, and particularly in conversational usage. (I doubt the examiner perceived the context in which “Ignoscite” appeared as a conversation.) Someone taking in (perceiving) the Latin passage as an actor or a playwright would have written “Forgive my blasphemy,” or “Grant me forgiveness,” or something of the sort. These translations project the tone of high-minded civic service and civic virtue that is implicit in the stage-set, the costumes, and the events of the drama. “Pardon me,” in conversation, is at best bourgeois British colloquialism. When read as “Pardon ME!” it suggests, even worse, the world of slapstick comedy, a movie starring Steve Martin (“Well exCUse ME”) or Charlie Chaplin (who would be first rate at the helmet-tipping bit, not to mention the escape scenes). In the theatrical modes, “Pardon me” is just as wrong a translation for “Ignoscite” here as “One never know, do one?” and it is wrong in exactly the same respects.

The examiner, however, was not testing for the ability to project oneself imaginatively, using a Latin text, into the world of ancient Rome, nor for the ability to bring into such an imaginative reconstruction the linguistic-conceptual matrices of one’s own culture. What, after all, does this have to do with an examination “in Latin”? As Perloff would say, note the assumptions. First, an examination “in Latin” is an examination in “reading” Latin, which is separable from conversation, speaking poetry, acting a drama, or writing original Latin text. Second, “reading” amounts to “grammar” and “translation”; as a result the examination “in Latin” becomes an examination in English about Latin. Third—and in spite of that—an effective command of English is not prerequisite, since “translation” consists of selecting from among five given choices “the correct answer.” Subassumptions: five choices are plenty; a translation is an “answer” to some implicit question; each answer is “correct” or “wrong”; only one is “correct” and it is “the” correct one. Fourth, an examination “in Latin” can take place in a hushed, cramped setting where the student can neither read aloud nor move about in kinetic response to the texts at hand; sounds and gestures have nothing to do with “Latin.”

55. How many people does one find in modern Italy who do not use gestures as part of their language? Should we assume that earlier inhabitants of the region were more constrained? Did their fascination with rhetoric, when they discovered it, reflect a desire to keep still while they spoke? Did Cicero deliver his speeches without moving a muscle? In court? In the Senate? Or did he just mail Xerox copies of the written texts to the jurors and the Senators, so that they could “read” the speeches as our high school students do?
ourselves with all these assumptions, we then wonder why so many young people who get our schooling perceive something in popular art that they do not find in “the classics”!

Let me put the matter this way: the gesture and English utterance that you make when you act the young Roman in his predicament are not phenomena that are separable from your understanding of what “ignoscite” can mean in Latin. Just so, the vocal and bodily gestures that you make when you act Macbeth saying “This” are not phenomena that are separable from what you perceive in the scene as a playgoer or reader. Just so, the way you sing or conduct the first four notes of “Joy to the world” is not something that is separable from the way you perceive structural functions for the notes on which you sing “Joy” and “world.” Likewise, your perceptions of Morgengruß are not separable from how long you wait on the fermata at measure 15 before it feels right to go on, when you sing or accompany the song, or when you transcribe it for piano solo. Your perceptions of the song are likewise not separable from how long you want to dwell on the lonely B flat in the piano at measure 12, before allowing the next note of the accompaniment to enter. (Our formal perceptions \( p_1 \) through \( p_9 \) intermesh with just such performance activities.) And your perceptions of the “XDY-and-YDX” cadence in Die Walküre are not separable from the way you conduct the \( fp \) dynamic and the change of tempo, nor is either of these separable from the way in which you act Sieglinde’s discovery at this moment that her adulterous-lover-to-be, the savior promised her by her father, is in fact her own long-lost brother.

The musical examples just above involve text and/or drama. That helps me make them vivid for nonmusicians—and for musicians, too, in a different way. Still, the reader who reviews my analytic discussions of the Schubert, Handel, and Wagner passages will find that I have said plenty about their purely musical analysis that is inseparable from the purely musical performance issues raised in the preceding paragraph, plenty beyond the literary and theatrical contexts I have also discussed. Those contexts are naturally also appropriate, and enrich the purely musical discussion.

56. I make contact here again with the sorts of ideas expressed by Lochhead and Fisher, “The Performer as Theorist.”

57. Wagner’s stage directions say that she tears herself loose from Sigmund’s embrace in the most extreme intoxication, and confronts him as a model for comparison (“reißt sich in höchster Trunkenheit von ihm und stellt sich ihm gegenüber”). Each twin has been ordained by Wotan to be the mirror and (dominant) support of the other; Sieglinde comes to realize that at just this moment.

All of Sieglinde’s deceptive cadences in G are laden with this dramatic import, as are all the G cadences through Act I. Most of them are deceptive. The deceptive ones typically involve harmonies including an E or a C\(^\#\) and/or a B\(^b\), as well as a G. The dramatic “presence” of Wotan throughout Act I is often missed in production, both dramatically and in E-bass events of the music beyond the Valhalla theme itself in that key. Audiences must wonder why the lovers can’t get down to business sooner. In Act III, Brünnhilde finally gives Sieglinde a good G cadence, as she predicts the birth of Siegfried. Sieglinde can thereupon come out with the redemption theme in G—her big moment both dramatically and vocally. But the Redemption cadence is spoiled and turned deceptive by the E in the bass and the E–E–B\(^b\)–C\(^\#\) in the trombones that undermine the cadential G’s in the drum and bass trumpet, turning them ominous. Sieglinde must flee from her enraged father, also Brünnhilde’s enraged father, who is now clearly identified as the source of the deceptive G cadence, the E in the bass, and the diminished-seventh harmony.
Indeed, it is quite possible to approach a nontexted work of music “theatrically” as well. To illustrate the point, I shall coach you in the dramatic role of “F♯/G♭”, within the drama that is the first movement of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. In one of your dual personalities you are F♯, the leading tone of G, fifth degree or dominant of C; in the other of your personalities you are G♭, upper neighbor to F, fourth degree or subdominant of C. C is the tonic of the piece and you are its antipode on the clock-face of the chromatic scale or the circle of fifths.

You enter magnificently, surrounded by a prolonged hammering diminished-seventh chord that is the goal of the entire musical impetus since the first theme got underway. Your chord is the first fortissimo of the piece and the first tutti of the piece. (Drum and trumpets are trying in vain to maintain the tonic C against your might.) Your chord is also the most serious chromatic excursion of the piece so far; the earlier tonicizations of iv were local affaires. You enter here wearing your F♯ cloak, as leading tone to G; but you abruptly hurl the cloak away and reveal yourself in a suit underneath as G♭, upper neighbor to F. Your diminished-seventh chord resolves not as V-of-(V-of-C) but as V-of-(V-of-E♭). By your mighty feat of enharmony, you single-handedly achieve the modulation from C minor to E♭ major, from the first thematic group of the exposition to its second thematic group. A new theme enters directly you have resolved, with the solo horn call.

In the reprise you replay this whole scene, with a big variation. You re-enter on your climactic diminished seventh chord as before. Everyone is waiting for you to throw off your F♯ cloak and reveal yourself as G♭. You throw off your F♯ cloak all right, but now you are wearing an F♯ suit beneath it! You resolve as leading-tone to G, and your chord resolves as V-of-(V-of-C) after all. The horn cannot deal with this, and the bassoons must manage the horn-call theme as best they can. You have now single-handedly warded off the modulation of the exposition, and kept the reprise in C.

During the development you display even more extraordinary powers. After the first theme has gotten underway in F minor, there ensues a sequence whose local tonics move through the circle of fifths from F, through C, to G minor. F and G are your potential tones of resolution in your dual capacities as G♭ and F♯, respectively; C is your antipode. Once the music gets to G minor, it starts to develop motivically; as the Entwicklung tightens, the bass moves by steps up the G minor scale until it reaches—you as F♯! Thereupon a new motivic sequence begins, using material from the second thematic group. This sequence moves back through the same segment of the circle of fifths, via the dominants of G, C, and F minor. Once the music gets to F minor, it starts to develop motivically once again; as the Entwicklung tightens, the bass moves stepwise up again. The steps up begin in F minor; then, pivoting through B♭ minor, the tonic shifts and the steps finally arrive at a tonicized—you in your capacity as G♭! F has now become your leading tone.

And then, after all, you throw off your G♭ cloak and reveal yourself enharmonically as F♯ all the time!! The enharmonic shift takes place when the “be-calmed” accordion-type alternations of the you-minor triad in the winds and strings shift to a you-six-three harmony that is spelled as a D triad in first inver-

58. Atlas, “The Diachronic Recognition” (26–27, 32–33) discusses these two passages.
sion. The dynamics here, piano, sempre diminuendo, and finally pianissimo, are unique in the movement and antipodal to the forte and fortissimo bluster of C minor. Also antipodal is the dead calm, breathing, riding-gently-up-and-down-on-little-waves effect, compared to the frenzied Sturm und Drang of C minor. This is “you-country,” if one may say that of a phenomenon so oceanic. From the first-inversion D harmony, the way back to C minor is clear for the reprise. You leave your “you-country” as a member of V-of-(V-of-C) after all, playing just the part you refused to assume on your first-act entrance. (But your big coup in the reprise is still to come.)

Now that I have coached you in acting F♯/G♭, do you not sense the cogency of the theatrical mode in connection with how you might play or conduct the pertinent music, and how you might make analytic statements about it? Is not the way you “play” F♯/G♭ (in both senses of the word) inseparable from things-that-you-perceive in Beethoven’s piece? Would not “playing” the role of E♭, or the role of F, or other roles, similarly engage things-that-you-perceive in the piece? (Some things would sound different to different characters.)

My skeptic will point out that this symphony is an exceptionally “dramatic” one, and ask how my contentions would fare in connection with less dramatic music. Here, finally, I must call a halt. As I said before, I am not proclaiming the virtues of any one mode of perception over all others. I am only concerned that our society encourages us to ignore some of those modes. To the skeptic I say, “Find me a piece we both like that you are convinced is neither poetic nor dramatic. Then we shall discuss the matter further.”